
PERCEPTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

3RD SURVEY | MAY 2022







The comments and opinions expressed in this document represent the thoughts of its authors, not necessarily of the institution. In the case of IPSOS, this company was only in charge of carrying out the survey with the questions that were provided by AthenaLab and delivering the consolidated data of the responses.

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3RD SURVEY

PERCEPTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY



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Introduction

Since we began this survey three years ago, a pandemic has swept the world, a new political cycle has begun in Chile after social upheaval, and Russia has launched a war against Ukraine, the global repercussions of which are in full swing.

Deep down, all of the above speaks to us of disruptions that are taking place in a very short period of time and that test the response capacity of the authorities, but also of societies that, from one moment to the next, are seeing their security, welfare and development affected.

In its third version, the survey by AthenaLab and Ipsos shows that, despite living in a changing environment, Chileans seem to be clear about the foreign policy objectives that are considered a priority, the main national interests of the country and the threats that they face. It is important that there be continuity in this regard, because in the long run it is what allows State policies to be designed based on broad consensus.

Without anticipating the results, we could affirm that there is indeed widespread concern about the deterioration of security that Chile is experiencing as a result of transnational phenomena that cross borders and directly impact the country, but also due to armed violence that originates internally.

The positive side is that these perceptions about the challenges looming over Chile's territorial integrity do not seem to translate into nationalist positions aimed at closing the country. Rather, Chileans appear to seek proactive management of relations with the world and clearly identify partners that can be counted on, some of which even have a long history of friendship and cooperation that goes beyond commercial exchanges, such as Japan and the United Kingdom.

We hope that the information contained in this survey is of use to the new authorities taking the helm of foreign policy and to those building a new institutional framework for a tricontinental country like Chile, which has managed to transcend its small size and distance from the centers of power, thanks to a diplomatic and commercial insertion that, until now, can be considered successful. On the other hand, the above facts and many more teach us that disruptions are just around the corner, and it is essential that opportunities not be lost due to ideological approaches that overshadow the necessary pragmatism.

In a world of limited resources, it is imperative to articulate instruments of state power in an integrated manner to maximize the possibilities of promoting our values and prevent the risks they face from becoming threats.

Sincerely,

Juan Pablo Toro Executive Director



Five notes on the survey

1) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UNDER PRESSURE

After three consecutive years carrying out the AthenaLab/Ipsos Foreign Policy and Security survey, it is very clear that concern is growing in Chile over border pressures caused by transnational phenomena such as drug trafficking and irregular migration. In this sense, we begin to see a trend: the general population and experts overwhelmingly perceive, with similar percentages, that these issues should be the main objectives of foreign policy (see figure 3).

For example, the importance of the fight against drug trafficking has gone up from around 80% in 2020 to 90% in 2022, in both segments. Likewise, concern about irregular migration has climbed from levels above 60% to around 85% in the same period. Border protection has thus become a decisive aspect, which is, of course, associated with the above.

Continuing with this line of argument, we could say that aspects related to broader security have taken priority over more traditional objectives such as the promotion of free trade or the reinforcement of the Antarctic presence. Ultimately, we would expect for those responsible for foreign policy to focus their efforts on social issues that affect the population directly and whose origin is related to international situations (even if they are not subject to the control of local authorities), such as the Venezuelan crisis or the increase in cocaine production in the Andean region.


It is also evident that for three years the promotion of democracy and human rights in other countries and integration with Latin America are not among the objectives that attract the highest percentages. While the former may be influenced by the very fact that Chile is going through a period of political instability since the social uprising of October 18, 2019, in the latter the lack of interest is consistent with a certain isolation that Chile has traditionally had with respect to its immediate region, since it is a tricontinental country.

Undoubtedly, the fact that Chileans insist that they prefer to play a proactive rather than a passive role in global affairs represents quite a challenge (see figure 8). Because although there are instruments of state power to exercise this diplomatic, economic, military and communicational role, there is no strategy in place to take advantage of them in a joint or integrated manner. In a world of limited resources, integration enhances the chances of success to relate to other countries in an advantageous way. The design of this comprehensive or integrated strategy (of which there are examples)¹, should be an imperative to the authorities.

¹ HM Government (March 2021). "Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy".

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Bellow is a list of possible foreign objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?




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FIGURE Nº 2

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES


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



FIGURE № 5


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


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FIGURE № 7

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES


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FIGURE № 8 CHILE'S ROLE ON GLOBAL ISSUES


In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues or stay away from them.



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FIGURE Nº 9 CHILE'S ROLE ON GLOBAL ISSUES

In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues or stay away from them.



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Multilateralism and the environment

For the vast majority of the country's population, the fight against climate change appears among the first objectives that our foreign policy should pursue, and it is also one of the priorities of President Gabriel Boric's administration. In addition to there being a ministry dedicated to the issue, it has acquired increasing relevance in international affairs and multilateral organizations, due to the urgency of addressing it jointly.

The climate crisis affects us all, and it is one of the areas of international relations that most clearly illustrates the need to coordinate the wills of countries and organizations towards a higher global goal.

A clear example of the above is the Escazú Agreement. At the time of writing this column, the discussion and — we hope — the approval are pending in the Senate of the Republic to establish said treaty as law. The debate in the Chamber of Deputies was profound and serious, and eventually a substantial majority, including several opposition lawmakers, voted to ratify it.

The Escazú Agreement deals with access to information and environmental justice; it also has provisions to create spaces of protection for environmental defenders. For our country this is very important, and while it goes beyond any given administration, adherence to this agreement is also a way for the government to return to the international forum and resume the leading role we had in environmental issues. Postponing Escazú represented a setback, both in environmental matters and in Chile's participation in multilateral forums, related to the prevalence of a mistaken idea about some provisions of the agreement, and a certain withdrawal of national diplomacy. This was also manifested, for example, in the refusal to sign the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, another issue that also worries citizens and requires coordination and joint work with other countries. Reversing this setback is our first task as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In this context, the majority opinion of those surveyed on the relevance of environmental policy is very interesting, and has remained stable in recent years. This reflects well how deep the issue of the environmental crisis has taken hold in Chile, and it can be an excellent opportunity to carry out the public policies and actions in foreign policy that we hope to lead with a sense of urgency.



Antonia Urrejola Noguera Foreign Affairs Ministry



2) TRADE AND INVESTMENTS, A DOUBLE READING

Despite the fact that Chile's network of trade agreements was an asset for accessing a large number of vaccines when facing the COVID-19 pandemic, it is worrying to note that at the general public level there is no generalized opinion about the benefits garnered by Chile's successful insertion in the world economy (see figure 10).

Only 56% 'agrees' or 'strongly agrees' that they have received direct benefits from free trade, which is a low percentage if one takes into account that Chile has 26 free trade agreements giving it preferential access to 86% of the world's gross domestic product².

This scenario is even more worrying if we consider that today revisionist proposals for international treaties are being proposed (and were strongly expressed during the last presidential campaign), and in the face of disruptions in global supply chains, since all of the above only fuels anti-globalization positions.

Although it may seem obvious, it is important to remember that free trade agreements (FTAs) are signed by the parties, when there are mutual interests that are reflected in successful negotiations, and clauses that allow updates by mutual agreement are also included.

FTAs grant legal certainty to exporters, promote competitiveness, expand access to markets for Chilean products, and promote the development of new productive sectors, in addition to lowering the price of many everyday consumer products. For countries the size of Chile, these trade agreements are also a tool that allows them to transcend the size of their economy and reduce distances with large production centers.


The commercial issue aside, regarding investments, the survey also shows that in terms of economic insertion there is practically a consensus of around 90% on the necessity of regulating the strategic sectors (see figure 11), as most countries do.

It is worth mentioning that during the government of President Sebastián Piñera, a Chinese company's contracting for the manufacture of passports was canceled after questioning by Washington, and at the same time, it was decided that the fiber optic cable that will connect Chile with Asia would pass through Australia first. That is, the issue has visibility through concrete facts. This contrasts with the persisting absence of legislation on the matter, which so far has not been mentioned by the new administration.

² General Directorate of International Economic Relationships (2018). Impact of free trade agreements: towards an inclusive commercial policy. Published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.15.

INSERTION OF OUR ECONOMY IN THE WORLD

Do you think that the free trade agreements signed between Chile and other countries have been beneficial for Chile?




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FIGURE Nº 11

FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION

Do you think that foreign investment in strategic sectors or sectors with high impact for the security of Chile should be regulated?



Chile, International Trade and the Importance of the Asia Pacific

We Chileans are experiencing times of analysis and redefinitions in search of consensus on issues that will inevitably mark the prospects of development for our country in the coming years. One of them is international trade. It is not a bad thing to remember the leading role so far held by our country's strategy of openness to and integration with the world. This strategy is key in explaining Chile's leap in development, the emergence of middle sectors, the growth of the labor market, and even the creation of increasingly more suitable conditions and culture for the advancement of the type of entrepreneurship and innovation called for to drive 21st century economies. None of this is intended to suggest that every issue has been solved; there are always spaces to rethink guidelines, priorities or strategies, but we would like to state that the construction of policies should start from this fact, so that we do not become disoriented in the heat of the discussion.

The fact that "promoting free trade with other nations" is considered "very important" or "somewhat important" by 92% of those surveyed (60% and 32%, respectively), confirms a broadly general appreciation for the benefits of the roadmap followed by our country in the field of international trade. From a simple reading of these results, especially in relation to the general population, it can be inferred that if anything is for certain, it is the legitimacy of what has been achieved in this key field.

The projection of our country towards the Asia Pacific has had such an impact that it's proven to be one of the best strategic decisions for our country's international trade. The cases of countries such as China, South Korea and Japan are well known for how they have boosted our export, import and investment portfolio, but what I also want to emphasize is that it is a region of the future: there we find markets to explore that are in constant growth, the new axes of power and global influence, opportunities for more and more Chilean SMEs to internationalize and contribute to bringing to life the inclusive trade that we want. The fact that 40% of the general population considers projecting toward the Asia Pacific "very important", and another 42% considers it "somewhat important", should motivate all the institutions involved to redouble efforts to promote our country's bonds with that region.

It is very positive that countries like New Zealand and Australia, among some others from the Pacific Rim, are mentioned by the general population as potential models for Chile. Indeed, there are experiences in the Asia Pacific that can be highly illuminating in the face of our transformational processes; from Australia's and Canada's export of services and creation of local clusters in the mining industry, to New Zealand's exemplary commitment to decarbonization and investment in renewables, to the successful Singaporean public-private partnership toward becoming a global innovation hub. As the saying goes, "Whoever wishes to learn will soon come to know."



Loreto Leyton Executive Director Fundación Chilena del Pacífico



3) NEW AND OLD FRIENDS

This version confirms that countries perceived as inclusive societies and where the State provides social benefits, especially New Zealand, are installed in public perception as models for Chile. Still, the emergence of Canada is surprising, both among the general population and experts (see figures 12 and 13). The question should rather be why a country like this had not figured before, given that as a society it has several laudable aspects, starting with its respect for the rule of law and its strong social cohesion, which stems from the fact that Canadians "tend to think more as a collective than as individuals".³

Another interesting aspect regarding the perception of countries is how highly the United Kingdom is viewed as a partner. Despite not being a major destination for Chilean investments, and the fact that there are not many British companies in Chile compared to companies from other nations (see figures 14 and 15), it occupies the third place among experts, with 78%, and the fifth place within the general public, with a significant 41%.

Japan is also perceived as a relevant partner: third place among the general population (50%), and sixth place within experts (77%).

This speaks to how these countries have been installed in the collective imagination of Chileans as partners over time, regardless of the current state of bilateral relations or their relative economic influence. It is what has been defined in international relations theory as "soft power", understood as the ability of States to influence the perception of their peers, through their appeal and ability to produce identification with their main values and virtues.

This category is still firmly dominated by the United States in first place, while China lost ground despite being the largest destination for Chilean exports. Reality shows that, when evaluating the status of partner, values and other aspects that go beyond interests can play a significant role.

MODEL COUNTRIES FOR CHILE

Which country could serve as a model for Chile?

Spontaneous Response, Multiple. Mentions greater than 2% are graphed ©IPSOS | Survey of perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

SEGMENTO POBLACIÓN GENERAL





FIGURE № 13 MODEL COUNTRIES

FOR CHILE

Which country could serve as a model for Chile?


Spontaneous Response, Multiple. Mentions greater than 2% are graphed ©IPSOS | Survey of perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

EXPERTS SEGMENT



POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?




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FIGURE № 15

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

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


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


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FIGURE № 17

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?



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Canadá - Chile relations

Canada's position in this year's Survey results appears to have improved. This prompted me to reflect on why positive perceptions of Canada in Chile might be increasing.

Our bilateral relationship continues to evolve. In 2021, we celebrated 80 years of diplomatic relations and 2022 marks 25 years of our historic Free Trade, Environmental Cooperation and Labour Cooperation Agreements. As an Embassy, our work is to build and express this collaborative proximity. I would like to think that our activities — political, cultural, commercial and educational — contributed to this year's results, but I am inclined to believe that these merely complemented recent developments that resonated in the Chilean media and public discourse.

Canada's experience and handling of the pandemic has served as an interesting point of comparison, paralleling Chile's in many ways. We made similar efforts to strengthen public health measures, implement massive economic support policies and mobilize vaccines for our populations. We both worked to drive a collaborative global pandemic response in multilateral fora, including for equitable vaccine access.

The 2021 Canadian federal elections attracted extensive coverage here as well. They took place just two months before Chile's presidential elections and were regarded by many as a test of public satisfaction with the government's handling of the pandemic. Ultimately, Justin Trudeau, a well-known leader in Chile, prevailed as Prime Minister, pledging renewed commitments to progressive, inclusive and feminist public policies, among others.

Canada is reckoning with the need to deepen efforts toward genuine reconciliation with our Indigenous peoples. Its urgency was underlined in 2021 by the shocking discovery of large numbers of unmarked graves outside of former residential schools, where Indigenous children were forcibly removed and educated away from their families. These revelations garnered a lot of attention in Chile and, while tragic, re-emphasized how much our two countries have to share on improving our relationship with our Indigenous peoples and heritage.

Lastly, Canada and Chile are facing unprecedented risks from climate change. The incidence of record-high temperatures, floods and forest fires in Canada continues to increase and echoes similar challenges in Chile, at a time when both countries are also becoming increasingly aware of the need to better integrate their polar regions. This has underscored the degree to which we consider each other mirrors and partners in taking on these challenges, as was evident at the 2021 COP26 conference.

These are some of the reasons that might have contributed to a higher positive perception of Canada as a model for Chile. The fact that they are broad and varied reflects the richness of our relationship and potential to continue deepening our ties, through domestic and international issues of mutual interest..



Michael Gort Embajador de Canadá en Chile



4) VISIBILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES

The perception of the Armed Forces is directly related to their performance in the missions they carry out, both in their more traditional tasks and in their complementary role supporting the population.

A first consideration in this regard is that the defense of sovereignty is clearly identified as the most relevant variable by all those surveyed. However, the range of functions of the Armed Forces has expanded in recent years. This is due both to missions of international cooperation, and —especially— to those of a domestic nature, such as the support for the community in situations of catastrophe or emergencies, and recently the collaboration with law enforcement in states of constitutional exception, whether on the Northern Border or in the Araucanía region.

A second consideration is related to the perception that the Armed Forces have a role in the surveillance and protection of our borders, whether land, sea or air (see figures 18 and 19). Among the general population, 77% (almost eight out of 10 people) consider it a fundamental mission, and 13% complementary. In other words, 90% perceive this function as legitimate or desirable. Within experts, 71% consider it fundamental and 29% complementary, matching the 90% perceived by the general population.


The third consideration relates to the supporting role of the Armed Forces in situations of catastrophes and natural disasters: 72% of the general population and 68% of experts value it as a fundamental task. If we add those who value it as a complementary task, the percentage rises to 94% among general population and to 100% within experts.

A fourth consideration is the high significance for experts and the general public of the protection of national interests, wherever they are located. This year the figure is 68% for experts (a significant increase from 57% in 2021), and 67% for the general public.

A final consideration relates to the variable with the highest growth within each segment (general public and experts), regarding the tasks of the Armed Forces. In the first case, "Support for the police in duties of public order" in the event of serious unrests, has gained significant support, from 44% in 2020 to 59% this year. In the case of the expert segment, the variable with the greatest increase is that of "Contribution to national unity", which grew from 42% in 2020 to 56% this year.

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean Armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.




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FIGURE № 19

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES


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



FIGURE № 22 TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES


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


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FIGURE Nº 24 TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES


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POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.


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FIGURE № 26

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

POPULATION AGING 31

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses. ©IPSOS | Survey of perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.





FIGURE № 28

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.







FIGURE № 30

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY


The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



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NATIONAL INTERESTS

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:




When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.

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FIGURE № 32

NATIONAL INTERESTS

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:



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
NATIONAL INTERESTS


The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:

FIGURE Nº 34

NATIONAL INTERESTS

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:






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ARMED VIOLENCE AS A SECURITY PROBLEM

Do you consider that armed violence is escalating as a security problem?



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-5%

-3%

FIGURE № 36


STATE OF EXCEPTION SOUTH MACROZONE

NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE

NOT SURE

STRONGLY DISAGREE / DISAGREE


Do you think that the Armed Forces should remain deployed in the Southern Macrozone under the framework of the constitutional state of exception?



 ${\tt Base: Total\ Interviewees\ @\textbf{IPSOS}\ |\ Survey\ of\ perceptions\ on\ Foreign\ Policy\ and\ National\ Security}$

A population that feels defenseless against violence

First of all, I would like to highlight the good idea of contrasting the opinion of 1,360 people from the Metropolitan and other Regions with that of 70 experts or opinion leaders; and secondly, underline the consistency between both groups of respondents regarding the priorities of the two most important tasks that our Armed Forces must fulfill: the general population and the experts agree on the defense of sovereignty and the surveillance and protection of borders. This is fully consistent with the first two priorities of the surveys carried out by AthenaLab in 2020 and 2021. Thirdly, it is noteworthy that both segments give third place to the role of the Armed Forces in providing essential aid to the population when our country is under State of Emergency due to natural disasters, which confirms the excellent evaluation that our people attribute to the polyfunctionality of our institutions (68% of experts and 72% of the general population, increasing to 74% and 73% in segments C3 and D/E, respectively).



Where there is a clear difference between both groups is in the general population's fourth priority: to assign the Armed Forces a role in the fight against drug trafficking (68%), which contrasts with the opinion of the experts (23%).

My conclusion in this regard is that the population feels defenseless against the violence and territorial control that drug cartels have assumed in their neighborhoods. Some areas of our cities and regions are crying out for a more decisive action by the authorities and greater efficiency by our police forces. They attribute the Armed Forces with a task for which they are not prepared, and regarding which the experience in other countries that have tried it has not been successful.

To combat crime, violence and drug trafficking, a government with authority and determination is required, as well as a strict judicial system, and police officers willing to go out of their way to control and eradicate these threats, for which they must have political and legal support protecting their actions. Also, this perception is reinforced by the fact that the general population assigns an important role to the Armed Forces in maintaining public order, which increased seven points from 2021, reaching 59% (with 62% among women and 56% among older adults). In my opinion, the latter demand is not only about public order, but also about reducing crime and violence.

The population wants peace and order, and out of confusion assigns this complementary role in preventing violence and crime to the Armed Forces; both tasks for which they are not prepared. Interestingly, those who most yearn for this involvement are people under 25 (58%) and between 26 and 35 years old (61%).

A special feature worthy of mention is the important support and, in some way, the recognition of the presence of the Armed Forces in remote places —that is really loving one's homeland!—, which has the support of 62% of the experts and 59% of the population.

A lower priority, both for experts and for the general population, is attributed to the tasks of protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring energy supply, which dropped 6% and 9%, respectively, compared to 2021.

Perhaps due to lack of awareness and because they are complementary tasks, the lowest percentages are found in the fields of international cooperation and contribution to development: 27% and 24% among experts (respectively), and 40% and 48% among the general population.



Jaime Ravinet de la Fuente Former Defense Minister



5) NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity can be understood as the expression of homogeneity or distinctive sociocultural vectors that, together, theoretically compose the representative character or spirit of a State. They are the common features that unify and provide cohesion to a society that is diverse, a form of collective and distinctive identity.

Hence, this year we have incorporated this open question —for the first time—in order to explore: What elements are the hallmarks of our identity? (see figures 37 and 38). Among the general public, the three most relevant elements are: "Progress and economic stability" (19%), "Culture and heritage" (17%), and "Security, order and stability" (10%). Within experts, the most relevant components of Chilean identity are "International relations" (52%), "Democracy and republican values" (46%), and "Progress and economic stability" (38%).

The results show several distinctive manifestations in the responses obtained. A first consideration is that the responses on national identity reflect, on the one hand, aspirational variables, along with cultural, geographic, social, and historical variables in both segments. A second implication is that the answers on national identity are more homogeneous with respect to their value among the experts than within the general population, where there is a clear percentage atomization of the variables evaluated.

Finally, in this segment, it is noteworthy that the factor "National symbols and values", which is communicationally so closely related to national identity, occupies sixth place among the general population, and 20th place within experts. As an initial conclusion, we could state that national identity, according to this survey, is represented by a large number of variables that are constantly evolving; hence the need to consider this question in a period in which we can analyze its evolution, pinpointing the aspects that are most identified with the greatest degree of contribution to our national identity.

FIGURE № 37 CHILEAN IDENTITY

What elements do you think should define the Chilean identity?

Database: Total Interviewees. Open-Ended, Multiple Response. Responses with at least 2% are shown.

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GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT





FIGURE Nº 38 CHILEAN IDENTITY

What elements do you think should define the Chilean identity?

Database: Total Interviewees. Open-Ended, Multiple Response. Responses with at least 2% are shown.

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EXPERTS SEGMENT




Methodological Annex

FIGURE Nº 39

SAMPLES PROFILE

NONE PONDERING

GENERAL POPULATION



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METHODOLOGICAL CHART



METHODOLOGY

- Cuantitative methods, through online survey application.
- Non-probabilistic design of a quota sampling.



TECHNIQUE

- Web survey applied to the Ipsos national web panel (General Population) and Customer database (Expert segment)
- Application date:General population:January 26 to March1.

Experts: January 26 to March 23.



UNIVERSE

- General public: men and women aged 18 years and over, from all regions.
- Experts or opinn ion leaders: list of experts or opinion leaders involved with the studied topic.



SAMPLE

- Sample of 1360 at a national level in the general population.
 400 cases from the Metropolitan Region and 960 from the rest of the country
- 79 experts or opinn ion leaders.
- * For a study with probabilistic simulation, its reference error would be +/- 2.66% (For total results with maximum variance and 95% confidence).
- ** When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.

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Documento especial nº1. La autoridad marítima. Sus roles en ríos y lagos y su relación con el tema ambiental



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































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