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CHILE


Ipsos

2nd SURVEY

**PERCEPTIONS ON
FOREIGN POLICY
AND NATIONAL
SECURITY**

MAY 2021

2nd SURVEY
PERCEPTIONS ON
FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY

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North
Atlantic
Ocean

SOUTH
AMERICA

South
America

0.1

Introduction

We are dealing with a pandemic that accentuated some trends that were already manifesting, such as the weakening of a rules-based world order, the return of competition between great powers, and the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic center of gravity.

In the case of Latin America, political fragmentation seems to be deepening even further, along with an increase in internal instability in several countries in the region as a result of protests over social demands – all in the middle of a new electoral cycle.

That is why we believe that it is relevant to have information and data to understand how Chileans perceive their country's connection to the world, right now when both are simultaneously in a process of transformation, as well as their perceived risks and threats, and the emergence of desirable societies and possible rivalries.

Due to the positive reception, we had last year when we published the "First Survey: Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security", and the encouragement to repeat the exercise – we were told that we filled an existing gap in the matter – we are now delivering the second edition, carried out by Ipsos. We thank those who answered the questions, both in the general population and the expert segments. We hope that the survey will be a useful tool at this stage in Chile's foreign policy,

which has been referred to by some as “post-consensual”¹, understanding that the lack of consensus is a description and not necessarily a goal.

On this occasion, by repeating questions, we were able to track and see which issues are consolidated, such as concern about drug trafficking, the conviction of Chileans in wanting a country that is active in international matters, and the positioning of New Zealand as a model. But we also noticed some changes, especially in the perception of countries like Brazil and Argentina. In addition, we probed opinions on new issues, such as foreign investment in strategic sectors, and the extended continental shelf.

In a year of so many definitions for Chile, as the world keeps spinning and we resolve our internal differences on the way to building a common aspiration for a democratic, prosperous, and safe country, we deliver the results and their interpretation. Of course, you can also arrive at your own conclusions.

Sincerely,



Juan Pablo Toro
Executive Director AthenaLab

1 Bywaters, C.; Sepúlveda, D. y Villar, A. (2021). “Nuevas voces de política exterior”. Fondo de Cultura Económica. P. 27.



0.2

10 Notes on the Second Survey

By John Griffiths and Juan Pablo Toro

1) DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A THREAT AND AN OBJECTIVE

The survey confirms how the fight against drug trafficking is seen as one of the main foreign policy objectives, ranked first by the general population (87% consider it "very important") (Figure Nº 1), and second by experts (with an identical 87%) (Figure Nº 2). In other words, this criminal activity is assumed to be inherently transnational, which should lead to active efforts in the search for greater cooperation agreements with neighboring countries and regular participation in regional interdiction operations, all while improving the protection and control of the national territory, as well as its routes and ports.

It is evident that since the pandemic began, a large quantity of drugs circulating by land or sea has been seized, despite the temporary closure of borders decreed for sanitary reasons, which demonstrates the adaptive capacity of criminal organisations. Even shipments from Mexican cartels were intercepted.²

Since Chile shares borders with two of the world's leading cocaine producers (Peru and Bolivia) and has privileged geography toward the Pacific

Ocean, Chilean highways and ports³ are being used by drug trafficking organisations as important national and global distribution platforms.

Also, while Chile was believed to be a transit country for drugs, it has gradually become a consumer, which is corroborated by data from the National Service for the Prevention and Rehabilitation of Drug and Alcohol Consumption (Senda) that show that buying narcotics in vulnerable areas is increasingly perceived as easy⁴. This verifies, once again, how conceptual divisions within the "drug trafficking industry"⁵, between producing, transit and consuming countries do not manifest in the real world.

The survey also shows that practically 8 out of 10 people perceive drug trafficking and organised crime as the most serious threat to national security, both among the general population and experts (Figure Nº 17, Nº 18 and Nº 19). The 2021 survey not only confirms the concern about this particular threat, but it also increases its relevance compared to last year's measurement (Figure Nº 20 and 21).

2 Emol, "'Operación Azteca': Incautan más de 3,5 toneladas de marihuana proveniente desde México', 14/12/2020 at <https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/12/14/1006622/operacion-azteca-decomiso-toneladas-droga.html>

3 Junta Internacional de Fiscalización de Estupefacientes, "Informe de la Junta Internacional de Fiscalización de Estupefacientes correspondiente a 2019", page 92. Available at <https://shop.un.org/books/informe-de-la-junta-internacional-90642>

4 Servicio Nacional para la Prevención y Rehabilitación del Consumo de Drogas y Alcohol; Décimo Tercer Estudio Nacional de Drogas en Población General de Chile (2018). . Available at <https://www.senda.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ENPEG-2018.pdf>

5 Glenny, M. (2013), "6 Recent Developments in Global Criminal Industries", in *The Quest for Security*, Stiglitz, J. & Kaldor, M., (Edit.), Columbia University Press, p. 143-154.

FIGURE Nº 1
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Bellow is a list of possible foreign objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?





FIGURE Nº 2
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Bellow is a list of possible foreign objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?



2) BORDERS AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Throughout the survey, respondents perceive a broad concern for the control of the national territory and its limits, subject to multiple pressures ranging from drug trafficking and irregular immigration to the renewed territorial demands of some countries, the presence of fishing fleets outside the exclusive economic zone and, of course, the current pandemic. Land, sea and air border closures – previously unthinkable from a logistical point of view and unfeasible from a political perspective – have become a reality as a result of COVID-19. British expert Klaus Dodds affirms that there is currently a worldwide “border frenzy”⁶ as a result of the coronavirus, similar to the one that occurred after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

Regarding the foreign policy objective, experts rank border protection in first place as “very important”, with 90%, a 9-point increase compared to the 2020 survey (Figure Nº 4), while the general population ranks it fourth, with 72% considering it “very important”, a 10% increase (Figure Nº 3).

Closely linked to the above, maintaining territorial integrity appears, in its three dimensions, as a national interest that is considered “vital” by 62% of the general population (Figure Nº 22) and 89% of experts (Figure Nº 23). Since each of these areas of concern is connected, it can be stated that the weaker the border control, the laxer the territorial integrity will be and, therefore, the higher probability of criminal groups willing to dispute and occupy those empty spaces and uncontrolled areas for specific purposes.

For this reason, we believe it is necessary to highlight, for better understanding, that there are dif-

ferent types of borders, of which Chile has several, according to the Dodds typology. Among them are “disputed borders” (with neighboring countries), “moving borders” (glaciers), “water borders” (rivers, lakes and seas), “no man’s lands” (Antarctica) and “viral borders” (sanitary for humans and animals). But what it is probably most lacking are the “smart borders”: those that rely on information and communication technologies to extend control over border areas and those who cross them⁷. Understanding their dynamics and behavior is crucial to adopt specific policies and move decisively towards a multi-agency approach.⁸

Towards the end of the survey, three out of four Chileans also consider border protection a fundamental task of the Armed Forces. Regarding this, some progress has been made after Presidential Decree 265 was signed in 2019, with its subsequent modifications, since the military was authorised to support the police in the control of drug trafficking, organised crime, and human trafficking in the Arica-Parinacota, Tarapacá and Antofagasta regions. In the case of the Chilean Navy, the control of maritime borders is a normal everyday task. The same is true of the Air Force and national airspace.

Nonetheless, the question that arises is whether border surveillance, in terms of land deployment, will be a permanent or temporary factor, which needs to be considered when distributing forces in the face of the new pressures that arise. In this respect, Dodds himself noted in a webinar with AthenaLab that borderline controls that arise in emergencies tend to remain high rather than return to their previous level, as experience shows.


6 Dodds, K. (2021), “Border Wars: The Conflicts that Will define our future”. Ebury Press, London, p. XVI.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 174.

8 AthenaLab (July 2019). Working paper No. 2. Frontera Norte: Momento de un nuevo enfoque. En: <https://athenalab.org/frontera-norte-momento-de-un-nuevo-enfoque-2/>

FIGURE Nº 3
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES


Bellow is a list of possible foreign objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 4
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Bellow is a list of possible foreign objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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Strong institutions against organized crime

Steven Dudley

Codirector y cofundador de InSight Crime



In a country that has one of the lowest homicide rates in the world, it is strange to find that Chileans are more worried about drug trafficking than they are about climate change, pandemics, cyber-attacks or an economic crisis. Yet that is exactly what the most recent Ipsos/Athena Lab foreign security poll shows. In fact, for those polled, drug trafficking and organized crime are consistently the most, or among the most “important” topics of concern as it relates to foreign policy and threats from abroad.

Just how do we explain this preoccupation? Perhaps it is just a sensation that sooner or later, Chile will succumb to the same cancer that has made a region with just 8 percent of the world’s population harbor close to 30 percent of the world’s homicides; or that organized crime, in its most sophisticated and venal form, infects governments at the highest levels, as has happened in Venezuela, Honduras, Colombia and Mexico; or that Brazil now has the region’s largest criminal group, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC), which has become a cocaine-trafficking juggernaut.

Some of this fear seems to bear out in the poll. Both the population as a whole and the experts overwhelmingly want to regulate foreign investment. The population also seems to have also lost confidence in Brazil and Colombia as partners. Of course, there are a confluence of factors that influence these opinions, but they reflect the inherent contradictions we all face in today’s world: We want free trade and the commercial opportunities that come with it, but we also want to shield ourselves from the apparent threats that this interconnectivity comes with.

Ironically, it is those same market forces that pose the greatest threat to security. Chileans, like most people on the planet, believe that you can protect yourself against organized crime and drug trafficking by protecting the country’s “sovereignty,” and 88 percent of the population would deploy the armed forces in some fashion to fight drug trafficking. But fighting organized crime is less about strong borders and deployment of troops, and more about strong institutions, vibrant democracies, minimizing inequities, and building and maintaining a strong social safety net. Market and political forces are eroding these protections, and Chileans would do well to focus more on fighting back to that tide.



3) INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY AND BENEFITS

Chileans emphatically want their country to be proactive in global affairs (76% of the general population and 84% of experts) (Figure N° 5), just like last year, which shows that there is little room for isolationist-type policies. From our point of view, this is a positive thing.

Now, when asked if they believe that the free trade agreements signed by Chile have directly benefited them, since they would be a concrete expression of a proactive attitude in international matters,⁹ the answers vary.

If we combine those who say they "strongly agree" and "agree", 47.1% of the general population believes they have benefited, while only 16.7% think the opposite and 33.3% is undecided. But in the expert segment, 97.5% believe they have been directly benefited (Figure N° 7).

This means it may be necessary to better communicate the benefits of free trade to the general population, especially because without reliable information, they are susceptible to disinformation campaigns, such as those that have surrounded the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which is now rejected even by political sectors that once supported it, despite the fact that it improves conditions of access to 3,000 Chilean products.

Another perception that was examined is whether it is appropriate to establish a regulation for direct foreign investment in strategic sectors (Figure N° 8), in connection with the debate raised by the decision of a Chinese state company to buy an electricity distributor in Chile, in addition to one that had already been acquired.

There is broad consensus in this case: 84.3% of the general population and 89.9% of experts "strongly agree" or "agree" that regulation is necessary.

It is an accepted reality that, in one way or another, all countries protect certain sectors of their economies for security reasons, although this has become more difficult in an interdependent world.

For example, the United States has the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFI-US), comprising nine agencies and chaired by the Department of the Treasury, which has the authority to review investments that may pose a risk to national security, and whose powers were recently strengthened.

9 General Directorate of International Economic Relations (2019). "Impacto de los tratados de libre comercio". Official document. Santiago de Chile.


In turn, China has a law that defines the so-called “negative list”, which establishes sectors that are prohibited or restricted to foreign capital. That list, admittedly, has been getting shorter over the years.

If one does not want to fall for the "false binaries", as a Singaporean diplomat puts it, Angela Merkel's government has tightened the rules for investments in strategic sectors in Germany.

Some Chilean lawmakers of different stripes have suggested a regulation on foreign investment in strategic sectors – which should be few and very well defined – as is the case in other countries. This would not affect the general rules for foreign investments, which are expected to continue coming to Chile.

FIGURE Nº 5
CHILE'S ROLE ON GLOBAL ISSUES


In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues or stay away from them.



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FIGURE Nº 6
CHILE'S ROLE ON GLOBAL ISSUES

In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues or stay away from them.




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FIGURE Nº 7

INSERTION OF OUR ECONOMY IN THE WORLD

Do you think that the free trade agreements signed between Chile and other countries have been beneficial for Chile?




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FIGURE Nº 8

FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION

Do you think that foreign investment in strategic sectors or sectors with high impact for the security of Chile should be regulated?



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Redouble efforts

Rodrigo Yáñez

Undersecretary of International Economic Relations



Citizens and experts agree that promoting free trade is a core foreign policy objective. This is consistent with the creation, in 2019, of the Undersecretariat for International Economic Relations (Subrei, for its Spanish acronym), which has joined the Foreign Relations Undersecretariat, thus strengthening the institutional structure of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and explicitly recognising its economic-commercial nature. Likewise, there is broad consensus that Chile's role in global affairs must be proactive.

Chile has been a pioneer in trade matters: it was the first country in the region to sign free trade agreements (FTA) with China and Indonesia, to name a few, and it has promoted innovative agreements, such as DEPA (Digital Economy) or GTAGA (Gender and Trade). However, more than 50% of the population does not believe that FTAs have directly benefited them, a figure that contrasts significantly with the opinion of the experts. This gap — also evident from the discussion of TPP-11 and the myths surrounding its negotiations — invites us to redouble our efforts to continue communicating the benefits of free trade. Our successful vaccination campaign is just one example of the potential of our network of commercial agreements and of our international vocation.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that both segments surveyed consider that foreign investment in strategic sectors should be regulated. This discussion, we believe, should put non-discriminatory mechanisms at its core, as well as due transparency and predictability, reaching an appropriate balance between our national security interests and foreign investment, an important source of growth and development.

Finally, regarding the model countries for Chile, citizens recognise, among others, our main trading partners — the United States and China — as well as those that experts call “like-minded”, such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada, with whom we work on different multilateral initiatives to ensure that the benefits of free trade reach all citizens. From Subrei, we will redouble our efforts so that our foreign trade is not just resilient, but also truly inclusive.

4) MARITIME PLATFORM AND INTERESTS

The second version of the survey shows a consolidation of the "defence of maritime interests" among the top five foreign policy objectives, with 60% of the general population and 86% of experts considering it "very important" (Figure N° 1 and N° 2). These figures are identical to those obtained in 2020 (Figure N° 3 and N° 4). In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been turning the sea into one of its core areas of action: the "Ocean Policy"¹⁰ was promulgated in 2018, and the prospective document "Seas of Chile: Vision 2040"¹¹ was issued in 2020.

Chile's maritime nature is more than evident when looking at its tricontinental geography (where the Pacific Ocean appears as the backbone), or at the structure of its foreign trade (where 95% travels through this route). In addition, the sea is a source of natural resources and an environment that requires special care in the face of overexploitation, pollution, and climate change.

In this sense, maritime interests are facing new pressures, which makes them a continued defence priority from diplomatic and security perspectives. These pressures include the renewed claims of Argentina, which recently issued new official maps that include Chilean territories, and the presence of foreign fishing fleets, especially from the People's Republic of China. In this same sense, the creation of maritime protected areas can be a powerful signal in environmental matters, but at the same time it requires the reasonable allocation of means for their surveillance to be effective.

Closely linked to the above, the survey asked if Chile has acted in a timely manner to claim the extended maritime continental shelf. A conclusive 72.2% of experts, as well as 40% of the general population, said "No". Also, 35% of the general population admitted that they do not know, which demonstrates quite a low level of awareness (Figure N° 9).

In December 2020, the government of President Sebastián Piñera presented to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) the claim for the extended continental shelf of the province of Easter Island, which includes the islands of Rapa Nui and Salas y Gómez. It is a territory of 550,000 km², over which today there are no disputes, unlike the prioritised southern zone. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned that this year a new presentation will be made for the extended continental shelf in Antarctica.


10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). "Política Oceánica Nacional de Chile", en <https://www.acanav.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Pol%C3%ADtica-Oce%C3%A1nica-Nacional-de-Chile.pdf>

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020). "Mares de Chile: Visión 2040", en https://files.imo-chile.cl/documents/mares_de_chile__vision_2040.pdf

FIGURE Nº 9

CHILE AND THE EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF

Do you consider that Chile has acted in a timely manner to reclaim the extended continental shelf?



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5) ANTARCTICA, A PERMANENT UNDERTAKING

The foreign policy objective of strengthening Chilean presence on the continent was considered “very important” by 42% of the general population, and “important” by 40% (Figure Nº 1 and Nº2). This remains significant, as it is a territory far from large urban centers and difficult to access. However, it ranks last in a table of 14 possible targets. In contrast, it occupies sixth place in the list of priorities among experts, 75% of which consider it “very important”. Still, there was a five-point drop from 2020 (Figure Nº 3 and Nº4).

In general, the perception of those surveyed does not seem to respond to the growing activities seeking to highlight the crucial importance of the continent for Chile. For example, the Chilean Antarctic Statute was enacted in 2020¹², as Decree 1747 (which first defined the boundaries of the Chilean Antarctic territory) celebrated its 80th anniversary. Likewise, the effects of climate change and growing geopolitical competition are motivating studies¹³ (such as the one published last year by AthenaLab and The Henry Jackson Society), seminars and press articles that speak of a change to the status quo in the area. Therefore, much work remains to be done for Antarctica to be positioned as a more relevant issue to Chileans in general, beyond the niche interest of scientists, diplomats, military, and geopolitical analysts.

12 “Chilean Antarctic Statute” (2020). Law No. 21255. At https://www.minrel.gov.cl/minrel/site/docs/20190906/20190906113642/ley_21255_ley_estatuto_chileno_antartico_17_sep_2020.pdf

13 AthenaLab- Henry Jackson Society (2020): Chile and the Southern Hemisphere: Antarctica in Transition? at <https://athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Chile-and-southern-hemisphere-Antarctic-in-transition-ENG.pdf>

Better communicating the work and role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Paz Zárate

International Law Consultant



The results of the Ipsos/AthenaLab Survey shed light on a movement of tectonic plates: a slow but undeniable evolution in the perception of the appropriate place of a Nation-State in a globalised world.

A comment should start with the overlap between experts and the general population, on the growing importance that migration, border protection and the fight against drug trafficking take on as foreign policy objectives. The phenomenon is common in Western developed or developing countries as a reaction to the increase in economic migration. Now, with respect to border protection, the survey did not cover the sanitary aspect, which would have been useful given the preeminence of the pandemic.

The very fact that migration regulation is considered a foreign policy objective is noteworthy. Migration policy in Chile is decided by the Ministry of the Interior, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the latter of which can only play a limited role in immigration matters or in relation to fighting crime (including drug trafficking). Therefore, this perception seems problematic from the point of view of expectations and responsibilities. The same could be said about the fight against climate change, where Chile has joined global efforts, but with a specific ministry (Environment).

Therefore, there is an information gap. It is probable that even among opinion leaders, little is known about the role of the National Department of State Borders and Boundaries and how this department is coordinated, for example, with the police, the Armed Forces or other State entities. At a time when civil society demands greater transparency and contact with local communities, it seems urgent that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs better communicate its work. This effort cannot be exhausted on border litigations, which are coming to an end.

Another noteworthy aspect is the agreement between experts and the general population regarding the proactive role of the State in global affairs. Perhaps the safest interpretation is to consider it a manifestation of a real, across-the-board interest in an integration of our country that transcends commercial aspects, perhaps as a reflection of its current state of economic and human development in relation to the region. The lack of adequate knowledge on the part of the public about international economic relations should be a matter of great concern. This is especially true given the increase of anti-multilateralism and anti-expertise movement — nationally and internationally, and on both sides of the political spectrum — that misinforms about the effects of integration. Moreover, it is not only the Government that should be concerned, given the possible outcomes, particularly in an election year, of the misrepresentation of foreign policy relating to free trade and investment.



6) NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

New Zealand, which was already a benchmark model for experts in the 2020 survey, retains the first place among them, with 43%, followed by Australia with 24% (Figure Nº 10 and Nº 11). In addition, in terms of the general population, New Zealand – known for its inclusive policies, high standard of living, and effective response to the pandemic – rises to second place with 8%, below only the US, which continues to lead with 10% (Figure Nº 10). Therefore, it can be affirmed that this country is beginning to settle in national thought as a model society to aspire to – even more so considering the responses to this question are open-ended.

It is difficult to know how much real knowledge there is about New Zealand behind the idea that it is a suitable model for Chile. Both countries have become closer through trade initiatives¹⁴, including the Trans-Pacific Agreement, which is still pending ratification in Chile. Their navies participate in naval exercises, such as RIMPAC. There are also programs to promote the learning of English by young Chileans. Some have taken interest in the Treaty of Waitangi with the Maori People amidst the conflict in Mapuche areas,¹⁵ and Aotearoa (Maori name for New Zealand) and Rapa Nui (Easter Island) are two of the three corners of the so-called Polynesian Triangle. But better getting to know the oceanic country is undoubtedly a task ahead.

Regarding Australia, ranked second by experts (Figure Nº 10), it is interesting to highlight its similarities with Chile, despite the distance that separates us. As Australian Ambassador Todd Mercer explained in an online conversation with AthenaLab,¹⁶ both countries are far from large markets and centers of power; they present insular conditions (in the case of Chile, due to the geographical barriers that surround it); have comparable populations (25 and 18 million, respectively); dedicate themselves significantly to economic activities such as mining and agriculture; and face common challenges, such as climate change.

But the most important thing, he stressed, is that they are like-minded countries, that is, nations that have very similar approaches regarding democracy, human rights, free trade, the value of institutions, and the international rules that should prevail in the Indo-Pacific.

Now, unlike the experts, who seem to have their preferences well established, the general population shows a high dispersion of options, with values below 10% for many countries. However, it should be noted that many of the mentioned countries are strong and efficient states in social coverage (not necessarily larger) and none of them is in Latin America.

14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, “Canadá, Chile y Nueva Zelandia firman nuevo acuerdo global sobre comercio y género”, at <https://minrel.gob.cl/minrel/noticias-antteriores/canada-chile-y-nueva-zelandia-firman-nuevo-acuerdo-global-sobre>

15 El Líbero (9 February 2017) “Chile y Nueva Zelandia, tan lejos y tan cerca”, by Venancio Coñuepan, at <https://ellibero.cl/opinion/chile-y-nueva-zelandia-tan-lejos-y-tan-cerca/>


16 AthenaLab, “Para los países medianos como Australia y Chile, la clave es trabajar en conjunto”, Ambassador Todd Mercer. At <https://athenalab.org/para-los-paises-medianos-como-australia-y-chile-la-clave-es-trabajar-en-conjunto-embajador-todd-mercero/>

FIGURE Nº 10

MODEL COUNTRIES FOR CHILE

Wich country could serve as a model for Chile?

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT




When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
Spontaneous Response, Multiple. Mentions greater than 2% are graphed
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FIGURE Nº 11

MODEL COUNTRIES FOR CHILE

Wich country could serve as a model for Chile?

EXPERTS SEGMENT



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
Spontaneous Response, Multiple. Mentions greater than 2% are graphed
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New Zealand as a model

Dr. Matthew O’Meagher,
Director of Latin America Centre of Asia-Pacific Excellence
from Victoria University of Wellington



The results of Athena Lab’s second survey send exciting signals about the potential for deeper and mutually beneficial relations between New Zealand and Chile.

Once again, experts have identified New Zealand as a leading model for Chile. This is not a surprise: when I served in our Embassy in Santiago twelve years ago I heard this view already, especially on educational, agricultural and indigenous matters.

What is new this year, however, is that New Zealand is now seen as a model by more members of the Chilean public. How can we explain this change? One answer stands out: the publicity New Zealand has received for its responses to the Christchurch terrorist attacks of 2019 and COVID-19.

Both crises were met with compassion, clarity, and firmness by our political leaders. Because our Prime Minister’s response to the mosque shootings was exceptional, voters trusted her to manage us through the subsequent pandemic challenge as well. Cementing that trust, too, were extraordinarily effective communications and helpful policies to help businesses survive lockdowns.

A sense of community spirit was also important. Firstly there was an outpouring of empathy for Muslim compatriots we had barely known, and then a sense of “we’re all in this together” against the virus. Underpinning both displays of civic solidarity were decades of a (mostly justified) national self-image of a people who look out for each other.

There are other reasons for our heightened profile though. In her wider approach to governing our Prime Minister personifies a new, inclusive and norm-breaking type of leadership many young people relate to. More broadly, our nation presents itself as a trailblazer and overachiever – one that is not constrained by its smallness, remoteness, or newness, but free to launch rockets, win Americas Cups, innovate in trade, and bring Māori perspectives into foreign affairs.

As we look at each other across the South Pacific, it is time more of our citizens got to know each other better. Although present times are difficult, we share many challenges – and we can look harder at solving them together.



7) PACIFIC TITANS

China and the United States are seen as the two main partners for the general population (68% and 66%, respectively) (Figure N° 12). In practice, there is no variation compared to last year, and both are in a virtual tie, since the difference is within the 2-point margin of error.

Among experts, the condition of "partner" of the United States grew 8 points, to 81%, retaining first place among the countries to which this condition is assigned (Figure N° 13). The most plausible reason for the rise may be in the arrival of Joe Biden to the presidency, since the relationship has not undergone significant changes. In fact, Chile has not had a US ambassador since January 2019.

In contrast, China's image as a "partner" fell 7 points (Figure N° 16), which is consistent with other international polls,¹⁷ reflecting the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and so-called "wolf warrior diplomacy",¹⁸ which describes the more confrontational attitude of some of its ambassadors. Why is this not the case among the general population? (Figure N° 15) That is a great question. The answer may lie in the solvency of the bilateral relationship (which has just turned 50), in the undeniable reality of the numbers (main destination of Chilean exports) or in the active PR carried out by former ambassadors, businessmen, academics and the Chinese embassy itself.

In the case of other countries seen as "partners", the general population's perceptions of Japan, Brazil and Spain remain unchanged; they are still in the top five (Figure N° 15). On the other hand, for experts there is a relative rise in the positions of Colombia and the United Kingdom, now in second and third place due to China's drop in position (Figure N° 16).

17 Pew Center, 12 April 2020. U.S. views of Asia-Pacific Nations, at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/12/americans-views-of-asia-pacific-nations-have-not-changed-since-2018-with-the-exception-of-china/ft_2021-04-12_viewsofasiancountries_01/

18 "Wolf warrior" is a successful Chinese film, with 2 available versions, in which the Chinese military deploy all their power against counterparts such as Western mercenaries.


FIGURE Nº 12

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT

■ PARTNER ■ NEUTRAL ■ COMPETITOR ■ NOT SURE



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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
FIGURE Nº 13

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?

EXPERTS SEGMENT

■ PARTNER ■ NEUTRAL ■ COMPETITOR ■ NOT SURE




When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 14

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?




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FIGURE Nº 15

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?




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FIGURE Nº 16

POSITION OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES WITH CHILE

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?



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8) BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

Although it remains among the top five countries perceived as partners, Brazil suffered a 13-point drop among experts, from 75% to 62% (Figure Nº 16). Among the general population it fell 10 points, from 48% to 38% (Figure Nº 15). This coincides with its position as one of the global epicenters of the pandemic, and its governing under President Jair Bolsonaro, who is criticised for having minimised the severity of the disease and for his belligerence towards opposition sectors and minorities.

Argentina also suffered a drop in "partner" status: 20 points among experts (from 50% to 30%) (Figure Nº 16), now being seen much more as a "competitor" (46%). Among the general population, the decline is less pronounced, with only 4 points (from 31% to 27%) (Figure Nº 15).

This is a result of President Alberto Fernández repeatedly comparing Argentina and Chile in terms of the pandemic response, but above all, of the new Argentinian territorial demands associated with the extended continental shelf, which include areas under Chilean sovereignty, thus ignoring existing treaties. In other words, the attitude of the Fernández government is affecting how the country is perceived.



9) PANDEMIC, CYBER SECURITY, CLIMATE AND ENERGY

Since the first survey was conducted when the COVID-19 pandemic had not yet unleashed all its lethality and consequent economic impact, this second sample better reflects the growing concern of Chileans about the effect of this type of health emergency.

Among the general population, 72% see it as a serious threat to national security in 2021 (Figure N° 17), a 9-point increase compared to the previous measurement (Figure N° 20). Among experts, the perception of this threat grew too, from 39% in 2020 to 54% this year (Figure N° 21).

In another field, it is striking that the general population's concern about cyberattacks has risen from 45% in 2020 to 58% this year, a significant increase that is related to the aforementioned threat (Figure N° 20). The pandemic has forced many more activities to be carried out digitally, so there may be a greater awareness of the seriousness that an intentional disruption could have. On the other hand, the experts are still concerned about this threat (63%), which remains without coherent institutional structure, despite an official policy in this regard (Figure N° 21).

The most significant gap between experts and the general population is in the perception of climate change, which is surprising in a country that is experiencing a prolonged drought, and where changes in the landscape can be seen with the naked eye. For the general population, combating climate change is the second foreign policy objective in the “very important” category (81%) (Figure N° 3), and it ranks fourth in the “crucial threat” category (66%) (Figure N° 20). For experts, it is tenth place in “very important” (52%) (Figure N° 4) and tenth place in crucial threats (42%) (Figure N° 19).

Finally, and also related to possible vulnerabilities in an interconnected world, the threat posed by the loss of access to energy sources ranks among the top five most “crucial” for both segments, with 61% of the general population and 58% of experts (Figure N° 19). Chile has already experienced the sudden interruption of natural gas access from Argentina in the first decade of 2000, so we already know what that means. Additionally, notable solar and wind energy projects are being developed, thus complementing the import of hydrocarbons and reducing the current dependence.


FIGURE Nº 17

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT

- CRUCIAL OR DEFINING THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
- SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT A CRUCIAL THREAT
- DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A THREAT
- NOT SURE



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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
FIGURE Nº 18

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.

EXPERTS SEGMENT

- CRUCIAL OR DEFINING THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
- SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT A CRUCIAL THREAT
- DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A THREAT
- NOT SURE




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FIGURE Nº 19

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.




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FIGURE Nº 20

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.




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FIGURE Nº 21

POSSIBLE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



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Climate change, a striking gap

Karen Poniachik

Director of Columbia Global Centers
Santiago de Chile



The increasingly frequent and extreme chronic, acute events associated with global warming – heat waves, hurricanes, droughts, forest fires, storm surges and floods, among others – not only claim human lives, but also have serious geopolitical and economic impact due to disruptions in supply chains, food shortages, damage to critical infrastructure, massive migratory displacements, and existential risks for specific industries, from energy to agriculture and tourism to transportation. In fact, climate change is considered a systemic danger for financial markets. In 2020, extreme events caused US\$ 210 billion in losses globally, according to insurance company Munich Re. In the United States alone, damages totaled US\$ 95 billion, almost twice the amount in 2019.

In this context, it is striking that only 42% of experts surveyed by Ipsos for AthenaLab consider climate change a crucial threat to national security versus 66% of the general population. In the latest version of the study on risks carried out by the World Economic Forum (WEF), extreme weather events, inaction on climate change and environmental damage appear as the three most pressing global problems; however, climate change is in tenth place among these priorities in the opinion of Chilean experts.

Avril Haines, United States Director of National Intelligence, recently pointed out that in order to address climate change adequately, "it must be at the center of a country's national security and foreign policy." Local experts, on the other hand, assign it a lower priority than the promotion of free trade and the defence of maritime interests. Well, in the catastrophic scenario that we will face if we do not advance in meeting the goals imposed in the Paris Agreement, there will be permanent interruptions in the trade of goods and our seas will lose their aquaculture and fishing potential. In addition, the glaciers will have melted, inevitably causing conflict over the border limits in the extreme south.

The general population considers that combating climate change should be Chile's second most important foreign policy objective, with 81% of those surveyed in favor of that option – almost 30% higher than the opinion of experts on the matter. We would need to take a close look at the third version of the survey to determine what caused the difference in views between the experts in national security and defence, and the general public.

Meanwhile, those of us who work on issues associated with climate change will have to strengthen our information campaigns and messages in pursuit of carbon neutrality as a way to face this vital risk to our security.

10) SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

What is astonishingly remarkable in the national interests section is the high evaluation of "the maintenance of a level of security that allows development". Thus, it is assumed that they are interdependent and complementary factors towards reaching the common good.

Among the general population, 58% perceive this interest as "vital or essential", and this number rises to 91% if we add the 33% who value it as "important" (Figure Nº 22). On the other hand, 87% experts consider it "vital", reaching 100% if we add the 13% who perceive it as "important" (Figure Nº 23).

It is estimated that this high evaluation by Chileans could be related to a community that is more aware of the close relationship between security and development in realizing the common good, which is the ultimate purpose of the State as a form of political organisation. This, in turn, would make space for the proposal to create a security architecture that allows better coordination and integration of all the instruments of State power to improve future development. Especially when there is a perception that the problem of armed violence is escalating, an idea with which 81.6% of the general population and 96.2% of experts "strongly agree" or "agree" (Figure Nº 32).

Moreover, security and development factors have an equally interdependent and complementary expression in the dimension of national defence. This is related to the multiple and diverse institutional tasks of the Army, Navy and Air Force, which include, for example, the construction of roads,

connection between communities, and presence in remote places, as well as their participation in emergencies, pandemics, natural disasters or catastrophes.

As an example, regarding their collaboration in this health emergency, the Armed Forces¹⁹ – in addition to continuing to carry out their traditional sovereign defence missions – have committed important material and human resources. They have not only contributed personnel in security functions, but also with specific health capacities, such as field hospitals on land, ships with hospital capacity, health care posts, and air, naval and terrestrial means of strategic transport, which are necessary given the particular geographic reality of the country.

They have deployed around 30,000 troops; collected, distributed and delivered more than 2,400,000 boxes of aid to the population and transported more than 122,000 kilos of cargo nationally and internationally.²⁰ All of the above represents social spending and a net contribution to national development, and is carried out with the national defence budget.

As to whether the current defence budget — which has been suffering successive cuts — is sufficient to face this multitude of tasks that are emerging for the Armed Forces in realms beyond war,²¹ there is no total consensus. Broadly speaking, in both the general population and expert segments, out of 10 people, four believe it is appropriate, four believe it is not, and two do not know (Figure Nº 33).

19 AthenaLab. "Las Fuerzas Armadas de Chile y su empleo en la pandemia global". Commentary by AthenaLab, April 2020; "La Batalla contra el coronavirus, la función militar". Commentary by AthenaLab, March 2020. Available at: Athenalab.org.

20 Ministry of National Defence of Chile (MDN). www.defensa.cl. Retrieved from the Ministry's Twitter account, 2021.


21 Griffiths, J. (2020), "Visión de la defensa nacional de Chile hacia el 2030", en *Desafíos para la Seguridad y la Defensa en el continente americano 2020-2030*. Griffiths, J. y Toro, J. P. (Edit.). AthenaLab. Santiago de Chile. P. 192.

FIGURE Nº 22
NATIONAL INTERESTS

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT

■ VITAL OR ESSENTIAL
 ■ NOT OF NATIONAL INTEREST
■ IMPORTANT
 ■ NOT SURE




When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 23
NATIONAL INTERESTS

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:

EXPERTS SEGMENT


■ VITAL OR ESSENTIAL
 ■ NOT OF NATIONAL INTEREST
■ IMPORTANT
 ■ NOT SURE



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 24
NATIONAL INTERESTS


The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 25
NATIONAL INTERESTS


The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:



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FIGURE Nº 26
NATIONAL INTERESTS

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:




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FIGURE Nº 27

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean Armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.




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FIGURE Nº 28

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.




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FIGURE Nº 29

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.




When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 30

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.




When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 31

TASKS FOR THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.





When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 32

ARMED VIOLENCE AS A SECURITY PROBLEM

Do you consider that armed violence is escalating as a security problem?





When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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FIGURE Nº 33

DEFENSE BUDGET


Given the new threats to security (drug trafficking / borders / maritime areas / climate change) and the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces to face them, do you consider that the Defense budget us adequate?



When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.
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Methodological Annex

FIGURE Nº 34
SAMPLES PROFILE
NONE PONDERING
GENERAL
POPULATION



METHODOLOGICAL CHART



METHODOLOGY

- Quantitative methods, through online survey application.
- Non-probabilistic design of a quota sampling.



TECHNIQUE

- Web survey applied to the Ipsos national web panel (General Population) and Customer database (Expert segment)
- Application date: February 26 to March 12, 2021 (General population), and February 25 to March 31 (Experts)



UNIVERSE

- General public: men and women aged 18 years and over, from all regions.
- Experts or opinion leaders: list of experts or opinion leaders involved with the studied topic.



SAMPLE

- Sample of 1360 at a national level in the general population. 400 cases from the Metropolitan Region and 960 from the rest of the country
- 79 experts or opinion leaders.

* For a study with probabilistic simulation, its reference error would be +/- 2.66% (For total results with maximum variance and 95% confidence).

** When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.

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Pensando la defensa nacional



N°9
Pesca ilegal no declarada y no reglamentada



N°8
Aproximación a una política exterior basada en intereses nacionales



N°7
El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas en la Constitución Política



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
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
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