


FIRST SURVEY

PERCEPTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY



FIRST SURVEY
PERCEPTIONS ON
FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY

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0.1

Introduction

“A nation is great not by its size alone. It is the will, the cohesion, the stamina, the discipline of its people and the quality of their leaders which ensure it an honourable place in history.”

Lee Kwan Yew, fundador de Singapur.

The events experienced in recent months, both nationally and globally, have broadly demonstrated that we are currently facing a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous reality. Sometimes, it seems as if we have not made it out of one crisis before entering another; from the social uprising to the global pandemic, followed by a severe economic crisis and what is to come. The future is coming too soon.

Faced with this challenging context, we at AthenaLab wanted to learn about the perceptions and concerns of the general population and experts on Chile’s foreign policy and national security. Basically, obtaining information that serves as an input for possible courses of action that will help the country to find a new position in the international field (or reestablish its position) and adopt measures to better protect its inhabitants. As a whole, this should help lay the foundations of a shared and recognized national aspiration.

For those of us who have spent decades in the field of international relations, security and defence, it is not common to have instruments that inquire precisely about these matters, which can

be seen and felt as a little distant, but are important nonetheless. We consider that this survey conducted for AthenaLab by Ipsos Chile, an international, independent entity dedicated to finding out people’s opinions through surveys, may in fact be an important tool in this regard due to its novelty. By making it available to the public, we hope it will serve many other investigations.

The first part of the document presents the main findings that our team obtained from their interpretation of the survey. The following sections contain an analysis of the results in the fields of foreign policy, security and defence, after the presentation of each question. We also asked external personalities their opinions on specific aspects to enrich the perspectives. Finally, the projections are shown to allow cross-checking of information. The survey methodology is presented in an annex, which concludes the report.

Sincerely,



Juan Pablo Toro
Executive Director AthenaLab
May 2020



0.2

Main Findings About the Survey

- There is a perception that Chile's foreign policy, in addition to its orientation to international trade, must take charge of issues such as the combat against drug trafficking, border control and migration regulation, so-called "intermestic"¹ affairs: international phenomena with a domestic impact.
- Chileans want their country to have an active foreign policy in South American and global affairs, not to be a mere witness to events, which will undoubtedly force policy makers to rethink approaches and seek opportunities to exercise said policy.
- More pedagogical work must be done in defence of globalisation and its benefits, so that the sectors who consider it the cause of the ills affecting the country do not gain ground. Chile depends on free trade to grow, given its small population and economy.
- All the countries perceived as reference models or examples for Chile are democratic, with open economies and inclusive societies that operate based on respect for the rule of law and trust. In this sense, New Zealand and Australia begin to fit into the Chilean collective consciousness.
- In Chile it is very clear that its main partners are the United States and China, but since the relationship between the two powers is in a pattern of increasing tension, one of the foreign policy challenges is to generate a response to this situation, that is, to elaborate a course to navigate these troubled waters, always having the compass oriented towards the national interest.
- There are no clear perceptions about the condition of most Latin American countries, with the exception of Bolivia and Peru, which are seen as competitors. This may be due to the internal instability of many Latin American nations, which does not allow us to discern their behavior. Therefore, at the foreign policy level, it is better to approach them on a case-by-case basis.
- There is the possibility of projecting Chile's identity as a country of the Pacific Ocean, where both its partners and its reference models are located. But that requires the construction of a strategy that involves our society as a whole. This identity and the Latin American one are not mutually exclusive, however Pacific Ocean countries present continuity and conditions that more closely resemble those achieved by Chile in recent decades, despite the social uprising. Furthermore, the above seems consistent with the importance assigned to maritime interests and the need for their defence.
- Most of the threats to national security are attributed to an external origin, with drug trafficking and organized crime appearing among the main concerns, despite the fact that Chile does not have the levels of violence of other Latin American nations, nor does it rank among the world's major drug producers. Therefore, it is beneficial for alarms to sound before it is too late.

1 *Intermestic* is a portmanteau of *international* and *domestic*, used in international politics for the past two decades.

- In general, Chileans consider national interests worth defending to be within the country, closely associated with the territory and the development conditions to which it aspires. However, this does not accurately describe the reality of a country that depends on foreign trade by sea and that effectively has many interests at stake outside national territory.
- Chileans consider having professional and effective Armed Forces that focus on classic tasks, such as the defence of sovereignty and national interests, to be important in order to be a respected country in the international system, which is becoming more competitive and less cooperative.


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Foreign policy: National Attitude in a Global World

The following figures show the value assigned, both by the general population segment and by the experts, to the foreign policy objectives proposed:

FIGURE Nº 1


Below is a list of possible foreign policy objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?



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FIGURE Nº 2


Below is a list of possible foreign policy objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our country?



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FIGURE Nº 3

Below is a list of possible foreign policy objectives that Chile could have. In your opinion, what is the importance that each one could have for our contry? Do you consider each of them: very important, somewhat important or not at all important?



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In Figure N1, the foreign policy objectives considered “very important” by the general population are: combatting drug trafficking (86%), combatting climate change (81%), regulating immigration (68%) and protecting borders (62%). The adherence to the first objective is surprisingly high, considering that Chile does not have severe levels of violence associated with that crime, nor is it a major world producer of drugs. However, it can be inferred that almost nine out of 10 people perceive it as necessary for the governments in power to exercise more committed and decisive international action when addressing a problem that is particularly serious in Latin America and that leaves no society unscathed. On this matter there is remarkable consistency with what the experts say (81%). The same is true of border protection and immigration, which makes sense considering that irregular flows of drugs and undocumented people pass through said borders. This topic was developed by AthenaLab in its working document

on the northern border, after conducting an on-site investigation.

In this regard, a few questions immediately arise: Can Foreign Affairs ministries foster better coordination of their respective police or military forces, intelligence agencies, and judicial authorities with those of partner countries to cooperatively address a transnational problem? Do diplomats need better security training? Or do some security officers require more diplomatic training?

In the experts’ case, it is interesting to note a more commercial view towards foreign policy, which can be partly explained by the successful history of the past 40 years. The projection toward Asia-Pacific (89%), the defence of maritime interests (86%) and the promotion of free trade (81%), all interdependent objectives, are seen as “very important” by high percentages of experts. Rather than suggesting a change in the direction of foreign policy,

2 AthenaLab, Working paper No. 2: “Northern Border: Time for a new approach”, July 2019, at <https://athenalab.org/frontera-norte-momento-de-un-nuevo-enfoque/>

here it makes sense to consider further improving trade with regions of the Asia-Pacific, such as Southeast Asia, or with countries such as India and Indonesia, which represent large markets.

A troubling difference is that the general population does not seem so convinced of the importance of reinforcing presence in Antarctica (43%) as a foreign policy objective. Although it is fair to acknowledge that the distance makes this territory difficult to visit or assimilate for most Chileans, it is clear that there is work to be done to further highlight the importance of having permanent personnel and bases. They are key tools in asserting

our sovereignty claims when it is time for them to be made a reality. It is an extremely important national asset, both as a regulator of climate change and as a potential source of resources.

However, a second reading on this point could assume that Chile's presence in Antarctica is not linked to the international agenda itself, but rather to the national agenda. This view makes sense if we consider, for example, that every day we listen to the weather forecast for the Chilean Antarctic territory. Thus, it is difficult to position Antarctic issues on the international agenda above other issues.

Foreign policy, a communications issue

Beatriz Corbo, lawyer.

The AthenaLab survey confirms the disconnect between the priorities of foreign affairs experts and the opinion of the general public. While the experts' main priorities are matters such as the projection towards Asia-Pacific, the defence of maritime interests and free trade, for the general public, climate change and the integration of Latin America have greater relevance.

This should make us reflect on how we communicate. While experts propose one thing, the general public expects another. This presents several challenges, especially in a scenario in which we have been hearing to protectionist, xenophobic and anti-globalisation discourses, which, given the world health emergency, have become much more pronounced in recent days.

Citizens and experts agree that Chile must take a proactive role in South America, therefore, initiatives such as the coordination of Prosur to face some aspects of the pandemic should be well appreciated.

There is also agreement on the role Chile should play in global affairs. Little by little, our country has managed to position itself in some areas that are of interest to us, and both experts and the general public expect that this line of work will continue.

Likewise, there is a striking degree of coincidence in relation to the models to be followed, indicating that Chile should continue to look at models in medium-sized countries and with economic systems similar to ours.

On the issue of national interests, the fact that maintaining national integrity and political independence are relevant for experts but not for the general public is worth investigating. Does the public, in general, no longer believe in the concept of territorial sovereignty, or aspire to a global system of government? This is not consistent with current anti-globalisation discourses. A deeper analysis of the causes of these assessments becomes essential, especially if we consider that normally in Chile the treatment of foreign policy has had important coincidences.

FIGURE Nº 4

In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues or stay away from them.





FIGURE Nº 5

In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on issues related to South America, or stay away from them.



Out of the entire survey, two issues reached full agreement between the general population and the experts, which can be seen in figures 4 and 5: Chile must maintain an active role in both South American and global affairs (questions 2 and 3). It is also a little surprising, considering that due to

the social uprising of 18 October 2019 (18-O) the country was deprived of holding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the UN Climate Change conference (COP25), which were two golden opportunities in terms of international exposure. In addition, the opposition had been

repeatedly criticizing the insistent diplomatic pressure that the government of President Sebastián Piñera had been exercising against the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro.

However, the setbacks suffered due to 18-O and the ineffectiveness of the measures to corner Maduro seem not to have had enough impact to make a majority believe that the country should adopt a less active attitude in international affairs. If we look at the glass half full (what was done recently), we can account for an agenda that may help us understand these results. From 2019 to date, the Prosur block was founded in Santiago (and was recently reactivated to deal with the coronavirus); the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited Chile to deliver his message to Latin America and the Caribbean; President Piñera participated as one of the few speakers at the Second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China; Chile was invited to participate in the last G-20 summit, in Osaka, Japan; and the country assumed the pro tempore presidency of the Pacific Alliance.

Although Chile has suffered a major setback on its way to development, perhaps precisely because it was going too fast, it should not be forgotten that the country had stood out as an attractive case for the region both in its own merits — political stability, economic indicators and level of security — as well as the failure of other alternatives, such as *Chavismo*. Also, an external validation of this idea must be added: the arrival of hundreds of thousands of immigrants was proof of the magnetism of our territory as an option for a better life. This situation achieved through decades, as usual, was more recognized abroad than within the

country, and even held the country up as a possible regional power, according to different indicators measured in a Geopolitical Audit³ conducted by the Henry Jackson Society, a prestigious London research center.

However, implementing a more intense foreign policy, which does not cower away from protagonism or even revising supposed consensus that sometimes lead to inaction, is a major challenge. It is evident that the legal-commercial approach has reached its limits, perhaps as a consequence of its success. It also corresponds to a world with more trust in globalisation and less competition between superpowers. There is now a demand to think of Chile strategically to bring together national interests, values and idiosyncrasy, which lead to positioning the country as an international actor with its own voice, as long as it has something to say. This point was addressed in two books: “Vocation for Peace: Chile’s Foreign Policy”⁴ and “Foreign Policy of Chile 2030”⁵, through the creation of various working groups that debated the future projection of the country at an international level. Although both contain many ideas worth highlighting, especially related to the promotion of peace and development, the world order in which they worked is changing in such a way that they require an update responding to a more competitive reality.

Whatever the vision of foreign policy, it does become necessary for the international and security agendas to act in a much more coordinated fashion in the design of collaborative strategies, the identification of interests and objectives, and in bringing to fruition rapprochement efforts with other states.

3 The Henry Jackson Society-AthenaLab, “Audit of Geopolitical Capability: South America” and “Audit of Geopolitical Capability: Asia-Pacific cooperation”, August 2019, available at: <https://athenalab.org/auditorias-de-capacidad-geopolitica-sudamerica-y-apec/>

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). “Vocation for Peace: Chile’s Foreign Policy”.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). “Foreign Policy of Chile 2030”.

An indispensable investigation with periodic potential

Hernán Felipe Errázuriz, President of the Chilean Council for International Affairs.

The survey prepared by AthenaLab and carried out by Ipsos is a necessary investigation, which fills a gap in the matter for the formulation of foreign policy and defence objectives. It would be interesting to maintain its periodic continuity for comparative purposes, and it would also be positive for future versions to add the evaluation of the degree of achievement reached in the stated objectives.

The survey shows the high valuation of experts and leaders of opinion for economic diplomacy, while the general population prioritizes the social repercussions of foreign policy: immigration control, climate change and, especially, the combat against organised crime and drug trafficking, in which both segments coincide, and which is complemented and shared by the protection of territorial and maritime borders. In the latter aspect, there is also a consensus to attribute the defence of sovereignty, intervention in the face of natural disasters, the combat against drug trafficking and the presence in extreme areas of the national and Antarctic territory as fundamental tasks of the Armed Forces.

However, multifunctional participation of military institutions is scarcely appreciated in the face of serious disturbances of public order, peacekeeping missions, contributions to development and international cooperation.

On the other hand, there is a significant gap in the prioritisation of the national interests and objectives mentioned in the survey; experts assign the highest importance to the maintenance of territorial integrity in all its dimensions – land, sea and air – followed by the defence of the nation’s political sovereignty. On the other hand, citizen opinion considers strengthening the population’s social cohesion and unity most prevalent. A similar discrepancy arises on defence spending, which is contrasted with the national agreement on the need to have professional and effective Armed Forces. There are also differences in satisfaction regarding the insertion of our economy in the world.


There are a variety of other relevant data, such as the general approval of an active role of the country in international politics, with an emphasis on South America and its projection to the Pacific, and on the position of different countries with respect to Chile, with the United States in the first place, followed by China, and Brazil and Colombia in Latin America.



© International Maritime Organization

FIGURE Nº 6

Do you consider that globalisation, reflected in the integration of our economy in the world, has been good or bad for Chile?



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In figure 6, regarding the question about the perception of globalisation and its economic benefits, there is a very marked difference between the general population, where only 16% consider that it has been “very good”, compared to 78% of experts. However, Chile repeats a common pattern on this topic: elites tend to be more globalist than sectors of the population that do not feel they have benefitted from such economic interdependence (even if they have). And elites are often blamed for not better defending globalisation, either for hoarding the benefits or not making them evident, since “globalism” is their ideology, a thesis devel-

oped more broadly by Ian Bremmer in his book “Us vs. Them. The Failure of Globalism”⁶. The political manifestation of this phenomenon, as we have witnessed, is the emergence of nationalist or protectionist leaders who exploit the divide between “them” and “us”, attributing the problems of their countries to external pressures from globalisation, such as the sudden arrival of a significant number of immigrants. This undoubtedly requires developing or updating institutional mechanisms to better face these pressures and even channel them in a positive way.


6 Bremmer, I. (2018). “Us vs. Them. The Failure of Globalism”. Penguin Portfolio, p. 9.

IN SEARCH OF POSSIBLE MODELS

The following figures show the countries that, both for the group of experts and for general population, could serve as a model for Chile:

FIGURE Nº 7


Wich country could serve as a model for Chile?
GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT



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FIGURE Nº 8

Wich country could serve as a model for Chile?
EXPERTS SEGMENT



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Unlike the rest of the survey, in the question graphed in figures 7 and 8, about which are the ideal models for Chile, we left the answers open-ended so as not to guide the results. That is why we assign a previously defined list of countries for the following question to be rated by the general population and experts.

As for the general population, it is not easy to identify a trend, since dispersion is too broad, without any dominant option. However, it can be noted that there is a recurring mention of several

European countries as models (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, etc.), which are characterized by having an institutionality that preserves individual rights and duties on the basis of respect for the rule of law, but that give a greater role to the State in those aspects that are considered better to address collectively (education and health, for example), both for practical and egalitarian reasons. In any case, it is the United States that gathers the most preferences (12%), a country that bases its development on individual progress leveraged on equal opportunities.

When the experts were consulted, however, preferences were clearly for New Zealand (42%), followed by Australia (27%). Both are consolidated states⁷, liberal democracies and open economies that depend on maritime trade to export raw materials and thus achieve prosperity. Both nations also have a natural projection to the South Pacific and Antarctica. Furthermore, they are members of various regional bodies, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Pacific Islands Forum, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11). And they are also experiencing the tension of having the United States as their main security partner and China as their main trading partner.

But in addition to these political, economic, geographical and security characteristics, these are countries that, above all, have managed to reach a

threshold of stability and quality of life for their citizens thanks to policies that combine criteria such as inclusion, efficiency and transparency. They are nations that are already passing through “the narrow corridor”, as Acemoglu and Robinson would call it, achieving a balance between State and society⁸. And in the particular case of New Zealand, its remarkable response to the coronavirus pandemic clearly shows that when problems arise in that country, the different actors, rather than looking for culprits, tend to concentrate their debates on the search for solutions within a framework of respect for coexistence and the rule of law. The first person plural is privileged, that is, “we” over “I”.

For all of the above, one can sense the enormous potential for Chile’s convergence with Australia and New Zealand, if lessons are drawn from these Pacific neighbors and adapted to the local reality.




7 Griffiths Spielman, J. (2008). “Theory of Security and Defence in the American Continent. Analysis of the cases of the U.S., Peru and Chile”. RIL Editores. Santiago de Chile.
8 Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2019). “The narrow corridor.” Planeta, Santiago de Chile, p. 56.

BETWEEN PARTNERS AND COMPETITORS

The following figures show, for both segments consulted, whether the proposed countries currently have a partner, neutral or competitor position with Chile:

FIGURE Nº 9


For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?



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FIGURE Nº10


For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile?



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FIGURE Nº 11

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or maintain with Chile: a partner position, a neutral position or a competitor position?



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Being aware of the difficulties in carrying out a selection of this kind, with which some people will agree and some will not, the list of evaluated countries was made taking into account their neighboring conditions, their role as determining powers of world affairs, commercial relevance for Chile or even being mentioned as references or development models. It was not useful to extend it much further.

For both the general population and experts, it is clear that the United States and China are Chile's main partners, which is also the case for most Asia-Pacific countries. However, this perception does not necessarily take into account the growing rivalry between the two powers in commercial, technological and security matters. There is a broad consensus that the long-term relationship between Washington and Beijing will be crucial for the future of the world, but that is as far as the

consensus goes, because there are different projections about the form that this relationship will take. Indeed, today the cracks between the two powers are deepening, now with mutual accusations about the origin and management of the pandemic, but it is still feasible to keep both of them as main partners. Will that be possible tomorrow?

Another country that is highly regarded as a partner by the general population is Japan (51%), which is interesting as well, since there is a long-standing commercial relationship, as well as historical and seismic links. On the experts' side, Colombia (78%), the United Kingdom (77%), Brazil (75%) and Spain (73%) are also seen as notable partners, attracting very high percentages.

In the "neutral" position, it is difficult to identify patterns, since the preferences are highly dis-




persed. Although Russia curiously receives high percentages in this category (56% among general population and 77% among experts), perhaps due to its remoteness or lack of significance of the bilateral relationship in itself, which could be interpreted as “neutrality”.

Regarding the “competitors” category, both the general population and experts clearly identify Bolivia and Peru as such, results that are produced following the long processes opened by the law-

suits they filed against Chile before the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2008 and 2013, respectively. This allows us to infer that the judicialization of bilateral relations only reinforced perceptions deeply rooted since the end of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884)⁹. It is also worth mentioning that the negative rhetoric of deposed Bolivian President Evo Morales may have further crystallised the negative opinion towards his country. In the second case, Peruvian leaders have been much more cautious, although the competition

FIGURE Nº 12

How strongly do you agree that Chile projects itself more as a Pacific country than a Latin American country?



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9 Fernandois, J. (2008). “World and end of the world: Chile in world politics 1900-2004”. Ediciones Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, p.38.

between countries persists regarding investment attraction and port development, for example. Finally, it is curious that the perceptions towards Argentina are split between “partner”, “neutral” and “competitor” in almost exact thirds. This lack of clarity about what that neighbor represents could be partly attributed to its recent governments’ fluctuations regarding its relationship with Chile; from the tense relations with the Kirchners (2003-2015) to the closeness sought by Mauricio Macri (2015-2019), to the now complex initial relationship with Alberto Fernández.

Although the so-called Chilean “exceptionalism” – the perception of being a country different from the rest of the South American context – has been documented in different books¹⁰ and essays, and

ratified in polls such as the Bicentennial Survey prepared by the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile¹¹, it is difficult to know what that means in terms of national identity. To this end, we asked the general population and experts if they agreed about Chile projecting itself as a Pacific nation, rather than a Latin American one, and the answer from both groups was mostly positive – although we did not specify that the categories are not mutually exclusive. These responses were notably consistent with others given throughout the survey, which assign a high value to the defence of maritime interests as a foreign policy objective (a topic addressed by AthenaLab in its first working document¹²) and which also identify, in the Pacific basin, Chile’s main partners and references.

Chile, a Pacific country

Heraldo Muñoz, former Minister of Foreign Affairs

It is striking that the general population prioritises (by more than 81%) the importance of climate change for foreign policy, as well as the promotion of human rights. This is very positive, in my opinion. In another sense, it is evident that our country has not yet identified itself as a Pacific nation, as we experts believe that this is the case, but 37% of the general public do not believe the same; something similar happens with the defence of our maritime interests.

It is good that there is coincidence in the prioritisation of South America for Chilean foreign policy, in the opinion of both experts and the general population. Something similar happens regarding the proactive role that Chile should play in global affairs.

Where there is a clear difference between experts and the general population is in relation to Chile’s insertion in the world economy. Among the general population surveyed, there is not the same good evaluation as among the experts regarding this incorporation. I think it is due to the current questioning/criticism towards globalisation, which has its good reasons, and the campaign against the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP-11). However, it seems that the attitude on behalf of the general population is of skepticism rather than rejection.

10 Fernandois, *ibid*, p.37.

11 National Bicentennial Survey 2019, Pontifical Catholic University. Available at: <https://encuestabicentenario.uc.cl/>

12 AthenaLab, Working document No. 1, “Sovereignty and maritime security: references and ideas for Chile”, July 2019, available at https://athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/athenalab_doc_1.pdf



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National Security: Threats, Interests and Duties


The figures below show what is the perception of both segments consulted on the level of threat to Chile (that is, whether it is a crucial, significant threat or if it does not present a threat characteristic) of the following events or phenomena:

FIGURE Nº 13

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it:

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT

■ Crucial or defining threat to national security ■ Significant, but not a crucial threat ■ Does not constitute a threat ■ Not sure




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FIGURE Nº 14

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it:

EXPERTS SEGMENT


■ Crucial or defining threat to national security ■ Significant, but not a crucial threat ■ Does not constitute a threat ■ Not sure



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FIGURE Nº 15

The following is a list of possible threats to Chile's national security. For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



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Responses make it clear that the community has an expanded vision of security, since they perceive political, technological, economic, social and environmental threats as “crucial” to the country. Although the group of experts recognizes a traditional threat – the aggression of a rival state (55%) – as crucial or defining threat to national security, it assigns greater importance to drug trafficking and organized crime (69%), cyber attacks (66%) and the loss of access to energy sources (61%). Although the general population agrees in considering the threat of drug trafficking and organized crime (79%) as “defining”, they then mention climate change (65%) and pandemics (63%), thus marking a big difference. Regarding the latter, it is worth mentioning that the survey was conducted when the coronavirus emergency was just escalating (between 10 and 31 March), so that number could change, for example, if the survey were

conducted today. The same applies to cyber attack matters, where voluntary confinement or quarantines to avoid contagion by the coronavirus have brought to light the dependence and need for a cyber space free of threats.

It is also very logical to see that Chileans feel more threatened by phenomena that directly affect their well-being. The greatest difference of opinion is reflected in a 26-point gap in natural disasters: 34% of experts perceive this threat as “crucial”, versus as much as 60% of the general population. This may be directly related to the subjective dimension of security, which responds to how the phenomenon is perceived to affect a specific group.

Given the breadth of threats perceived by Chileans, it is considered imperative that the next step is to develop a national security architecture ded-

icated to preventing them. In addition, it becomes necessary to develop an interagency process between the various State agencies, private and civil, along with citizens, who in this new scenario of international security cease to be a passive subject, and become a key and active player in solving problems.

The invisible enemy has a face: drug trafficking

Lucía Dammert, tenured professor at the Faculty of Humanities, Universidad de Santiago de Chile

The threat that the population and experts consider crucial or defining for national security is drug trafficking and organized crime (79% and 69%, respectively). The result is not surprising, since the hypotheses of conflict with neighboring countries have decreased substantially, and climate change has not yet been fully recognised by the population as a security issue, but media coverage and the political debate on the importance and the magnitude of drug trafficking is significant. Furthermore, the public recognises that combatting it should be the main priority of foreign policy, while experts place it fifth.

The increase in organised crime has multiple facets, from human trafficking to illegal mining, including weapons trafficking and, of course, drug trafficking. It operates through a global network of illegal and legal actors — who also give money laundering a kinder but equally deadly face — however, this network is deeply invisible to citizens and even experts.


Foreign policy requires serious coordination mechanisms to deal with organised crime, which includes police collaboration, but also anti-corruption procedures and the need for greater transparency of information. The combat against drugs as a foreign policy has had enormous costs for Latin American countries, concentrating the effort on repression and abandoning the serious public health problems that its consumption implies. Chile is no longer a drug-transit country, and understanding the complexities of this phenomenon can lead us to more effective policy frameworks than the ones that are currently being developed.

FIGURE Nº 16

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT

■ Vital or Essential ■ Important ■ Not of national interest ■ Not sure




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FIGURE Nº 17

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it:

EXPERTS SEGMENT

■ Vital or Essential ■ Important ■ Not of national interest ■ Not sure




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FIGURE Nº 18

The following is a list of possible national interests. For each item, select whether you consider it vital or essential, important, or not of national interest.

% VITAL OR ESSENTIAL

■ Experts ■ General population



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The results demonstrate that maintaining the integrity of the territory (land, sea and air) is a relevant national interest. As much as 92% of experts considered it “vital or essential” (the highest percentage), as did 63% of the general population (the second highest preference, after strengthening social cohesion and national unity, which obtained 66%).

A second relevant aspect is the 42-point gap between experts and the general population about maintaining political independence: 88% of the experts considered this “vital”, versus only 46% of the general population. Perhaps the question itself posed an additional difficulty for the general population to understand the scope of political independence, considering that the maintenance of territorial integrity, a closely related variable to political independence, obtained 63%.

On the other hand, there is almost full coincidence about the need to strengthen the social cohesion and unity of the population. While 70% of the experts considered this variable as “vital”, the general population put the figure at 66%. This response was likely influenced by the effects of the social uprising of 18 October, which seriously affected unity and cohesion of the national population.

A remarkable aspect is the high valuation achieved among the experts in the control of Chilean seas: 78% placed it in the category of “vital”, while by the general public it was ranked fourth most vital with 57%. This would indicate greater awareness by Chileans of the national maritime condition, as well as the defence of its resources by Chileans.

The association between the concepts of security and development, as two sides of the same coin, and their interdependence for the achievement of the common good, seems to be well assumed by both groups, since 72% of experts and 62% of the general population place it within the category of “vital”.

In summary, as far as national interests are concerned, internal matters are perceived as more vital than those associated with Chile’s integration with the world – such as, for example, its stability in the Pacific – with a significant degree of consistency between the experts and the general public. Integration was placed by 48% of the experts and 42% of the general public in the “vital” category; while stability in the Pacific obtained 42% and 41%, respectively.

These results are somewhat surprising, considering that Chile is a highly globalized country in economic terms, and its main partners are distributed throughout the Pacific, with whom goods are exchanged by sea. Perhaps this is because security is not yet well understood in its global or interdependent dimension. In other words, it is likely that for most people, Chile’s interests are mainly within its territory and that is where they are defended. This is imprecise and does not do justice to the fact that the armed forces play a leading role in highly complex international military exercises, such as RIMPAC in the Pacific, nor does it do justice to their sustained contribution to peacekeeping missions, as was the case in Haiti. Everything that contributes to improving global stability benefits Chile, both in security and economic dimensions.

FIGURE Nº 19

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it:

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT

■ Fundamental ■ Complementary ■ Beyond their scope ■ Not sure



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FIGURE Nº 20

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it:

EXPERTS SEGMENT


■ Fundamental ■ Complementary ■ Beyond their scope ■ Not sure



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FIGURE Nº 21

The following is a list of possible tasks for the Chilean armed Forces. For each of these tasks, select whether you consider it to be a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.



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The survey widely confirms that the defence of sovereignty is considered the main task of the Armed Forces (76% of the general public and 95% of experts). However, it is recognized that their contributions or missions are not limited to this area. The earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and mega-fires suffered over the last decade can explain why a significant number of participants consider their help in the event of natural disasters “fundamental” (70% of the general public and 75% of experts).

Likewise, border surveillance is considered essential by 77% of experts and 78% of the general public; and presence in remote places by 66% and 59%, respectively. All of these actions have been carried out in practice, with greater emphasis in the last five years. Likewise, the mission of ensuring the energy supply has emerged, being perceived as a relevant national vulnerability by both experts (50%) and the general public (49%).

With a lower but still significant preference, 27% of experts and 35% of the general public consider the contribution to international cooperation “complementary”. In this same sense, the contribution to national unity obtains 42% and 32% (respectively); the contribution to national development, 48% and 34%; and the protection of critical infrastructure, 44% and 47%. In this case, it is possible that an order of priorities may be arising intuitively, but as they are Defence mission areas, perhaps what is appropriate is to make a greater emphasis to promote or visibilize them compared to the more traditional priorities.

An area in which there is a significant difference between experts and the general public is the participation of the Armed Forces in the combat against drug trafficking. This task is considered “fundamental” by 66% of the general public, whereas experts are more cautious and 50% of them see it as a “complementary” function. This

shows that in the general population, the opinion on collective security is highly influenced by the concept of “subjective security”, coined by Arnold Wolfers in noting that individual perception of one’s own security is decisive.

In summary, the survey confirms that regarding the tasks of the Armed Forces, established in their mission areas, their core function is

the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since they are essential for national security, as an instrument of state power, they must additionally participate in functions of security, development, unity and social cohesion, clearly expanding the spectrum of the use of force from the kinetic, or use of force in its most traditional dimension, to the non-kinetic, in its complementary dimension of societal aid.

13 AthenaLab, Working document No. 7, “The role of the Armed Forces in the political Constitution”, February 2020, available at <https://athenalab.org/el-papel-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-en-la-constitucion-politica>

The need to deepen defence knowledge

Gabriel Gaspar, former Undersecretary of War as well as of Armed Forces

The survey allows us to visualize the existing diversity regarding vital issues of the Armed Forces. For example, the defence of sovereignty is the first priority for the experts. Instead, the general public assign great importance to a task that essentially belongs to the police: the combat against drug trafficking.

The explanation may be multifactorial. Maybe the population estimates that the police institutions are overwhelmed, or they distrust some officials who collude with organised crime (a phenomenon that we have seen in other countries in the region), or other hypotheses.

In relation to the dimension of the Armed Forces required “for Chile to be respected”, there are also sensitive differences. The question is not very clear, what is “to be respected”? For the country to inhibit possible threats? This recalls a controversy that even made it inside the Ministry of Defence itself, where some voices claimed that Chile has no threats. The defence of national interests is not something abstract. The degree of probability of a threat must be evaluated rigorously and periodically; the contrary would be falling for idealism. For Chile to have a modern and professional defence device is one of the basic guarantees in order to achieve the development and security of the country. Consider just one piece of information from recent history: the country’s territorial integrity has been put into question in recent years by two of our neighbors. Finally, the issue of military spending requires more information. Spending includes wages and salaries, supplies and operating expenses, all of which has been in the budget and has been a continuous expense since 1990. The acquisition of weapons systems is another item that, until recently, was governed by the Restricted Law on Copper. In some measurements, personnel pensions are also included in military spending, which is the fastest growing item. A rigorous debate on military spending should consider what aspects are to be analysed, otherwise the discussion is often based on inconsistent data.



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
Regarding the need to have effective and professional Armed Forces for Chile to be respected in the international arena, there is no doubt in either group: 97% of experts and 74% of the general population “strongly agree” or “agree”. This presents the ongoing challenge of precisely strengthening their efficiency and professionalism.

At the same time, it is relevant to understand both the 15% of the general public who neither agree nor disagree, as well as the 10% who disagree or strongly disagree. The above may correspond to a lack of knowledge about the functions and real contribution of Defence in everyday domestic af-

fairs. This might suggest that the Armed Forces need to make greater efforts to permeate society and promote a better understanding of their relevant role both in times of peace and conflict. Both scenarios require highly professional and trained military personnel, because in the era of knowledge, the defence’s main asset will undoubtedly be the individual capacity of its members. Conversely, a less professional and prepared military is the recipe for disaster in the defence role. Additionally, deterrence is largely based on the professional quality of the Armed Forces, which to date have a very good international reputation.

FIGURE Nº 22

How strongly do you agree that Chile need effective and professional armed forces in order to be respected on an international level?




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Regarding our country’s average military expenditure, there is a greater trend among the general population to consider it high (54.4%), whereas most experts considered it adequate (71.9%). It is worth mentioning that average spending in Latin America is 1.74% of GDP, and the level required to be considered adequate by NATO is 2%.

In summary, there is a greater tendency in the Defence field to favor a broader spectrum in the use of force in the context of efficient, professional, duly equipped and financed military forces, to ensure the security of Chile and its interests in the face of complex threats.

FIGURE Nº 23

Given the current and future threats that Chile may face, do you consider Chile's military spending (1.9% of GDP in 2018, according to World Bank figures) high, adequate or low?



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The importance of respect for the Armed Forces

Peter Roberts, Director of Military Sciences, Royal United Services Institute

Data such as this, commissioned by AthenaLab, is critical to understanding domestic views about the Armed Forces of a state. Whilst they only indicate views at a certain point in time, and are subject to events at that moment (Covid19, a large drugs seizure, or a military response to an civilian emergency), over time the same questions will start to indicate a more interesting baseline of the relationship between the people and the military. There are few more important topics to consider, either for governments or for militaries. It could only have been AthenaLab to recognise this: they are to be congratulated in commissioning this vital work.

This data itself is interesting in that current attitudes in Chile towards the armed forces are similar to those in most liberal democracies in Europe or Asia, but remarkably different to those of neighbouring states in South America. The issues might be slightly different, but the core belief, trust and deep connection between the Chilean people and their military belies a more complex history. One should not be concerned that specific answers do not demonstrate a perfect understanding of the exact roles of the military (they never do). More important is the high regard with which the people hold their armed forces.

In difficult and challenging times, such regard should not be squandered.



Possible Futures, Some Reflections

1. A ROLE FOR CHILE: FROM OFFSHORE BALANCING TO NODE

Until now, Chile's foreign policy has been managed on the basis of four basic principles: legal equality of nations; non-intervention in internal affairs of other nations; an open economy as a factor of economic growth, and the search for dissuasive balances with neighboring countries. Different governments, from 1990 until today, have put them into practice with greater or lesser emphasis, and they have been the basis for the consensus that make it possible to categorise foreign policy as a State policy.

However, recent changes in the international sphere — such as the growing rivalry between the United States and China, the weakening of the rules-based world order, the increase in protectionist measures, the decrease in effectiveness of multilateral cooperation mechanisms, or the regional spread of the Venezuelan crisis — make it necessary to look for new fronts and forms of action to interact proactively and beneficially with the rest of the planet. As Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, summarized in "A World in Disarray", the 21st century will be very difficult to manage, and will imply a change regarding almost four previous centuries of history¹⁴.

Although it does not seem to have been part of a design or a desired effect, the truth is that Chile has been exercising a role somewhat resembling that which the United Kingdom had played as a mediator between the European Union and the

Euro-Atlantic community (i.e. the United States and Canada). The difference is that Chile fulfills this function between South America and the Asia-Pacific, thanks to its early insertion in the latter, a path that many now imitate (although they may not admit it). The most recent example is the effort made during the second term of President Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018) to bring the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur closer, or to keep the Trans-Pacific Agreement afloat, despite the withdrawal of the United States, both steps taken by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Hernando Muñoz.

Conceptually, the ideas of "offshore balancing" or "nodal nation" might summarise and help to better understand the role that Chile may play, if people consider it important to have an active role in global and South American affairs, as the survey suggests.

"Offshore balancing" is a realistic and large-scope strategy that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt¹⁵ recommend to maintain the primacy of the United States in the future, limiting its objectives and calibrating commitments in specific regions. Nevertheless, the idea that a country can manage its degree of involvement in the world is highly attractive even for countries like Chile, since this strategy helps to avoid "the waste of resources in costly and counterproductive crusades, allowing the government to invest more in long-term ingredients of power and prosperity: education, infrastructure, research and development".


14 Haass, R. (2017). "A World in Disarray". Penguin Random House, New York.

15 Mearsheimer, J. J. and Walt, S. M. "The Case for Offshore Balancing". Foreign Affairs Magazine, July-August 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing>

But in order to make that possible, it is necessary to define and redefine areas of interest, even if that means reducing presence in some areas and increasing it in others. To this end, it would be very useful to prepare a strategic framework of purpos-

es, following a practical model for the country's own clarity and that of other countries. Again, New Zealand seems like a suitable benchmark. As an example, a chart used by the New Zealand Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs:

FIGURE Nº 24



Despite its distance from the centers of power as well as its overlapping geographical categories (American, Oceanic and Antarctic), Chile should be able to project its foreign and defence policy towards different regions, depending on the circumstances that define that presence. In South America, Chile can help maintain economic and political composure in a region where it often falters due to populist fevers; while it can offer Asia-Pacific a port of entry where financial stability and legal certainty serve to establish offices for their companies. Just as Chile can actively pressure the Venezuelan dictatorship to try to bring about democratic change, it can also use its voice to defend free trade. This is what we define as the exercise of “offshore balancing”, with its eyes set on the effective search for balances from a distance.

This requires the existence of all the conditions that allow a country like Chile to play its own game, that is, to be proactive and not just settle for mere

spectatorship. These conditions are a real opportunity for potentially effective action, physical capacity to follow the issue through, imagination to address it, and credibility to convince others, as suggested by former Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans¹⁶.

In addition, an element that should be added to help promote offshore balancing is the need for world-class logistics, communications, energy or financial infrastructure that can make the country a node within global supply chains. It is essential to develop a robust cybersecurity system, because there is no better investment than connectivity, as Parag Khanna advises, citing the case of Dubai, which became one of the six global cities in the world in four decades by offering all kinds of first-class services and facilities. “If you build it, they will come”¹⁷, adds the author of “Connectography”, a concept that merges connectivity and geography.



16 Evans, G. “Middle Power Diplomacy”, Lecture to Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University, 17 May 2019, available at: <https://www.gevans.org/speeches/Speech692.html>

17 Khanna, P. (2016). “Connectography”. Penguin Random House, New York, p. 268.

2. BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA, OR HOW TO NAVIGATE IN TROUBLED WATERS

According to Graham T. Allison, today's crucial question about the global order is whether China and the United States will be able to escape the "Thucydides Trap"¹⁸. The reference to the Greek historian points to the dangers that arise when a rising power competes against one that is already established, as Athens challenged Sparta in Ancient Greece, or as Germany did with Great Britain a century ago. The experience is not encouraging. Harvard's Belfer Center concluded that, in 12 of 16 cases reviewed in the past 500 years, the result was... war. The cases in which the parties avoided the armed conflict required enormous, painful concessions on both sides. However, Allison does not believe that fate is set in stone and believes that, if both countries persist in constructing mutual trust, it is perfectly possible to avoid a confrontation.

Bruno Maçães¹⁹, on the other hand, proposes not one, but four scenarios that may occur upon the possible realisation of the Belt and Road Initiative, the largest infrastructure project of our time, which includes the construction – through billions in Chinese loans – of transport, energy and data corridors to improve connectivity between Asia, Africa and Europe, where all roads lead to Beijing:

- China is gradually integrated into the liberal world order. Its political model converges with that of liberal Western democracies, even as it continues to show distinctive features. Its economy grows, reaching parity with that of the United States, and it approaches Western standards of living. The two countries effectively run the world economy together, but in other global power dimensions – political, military and cultural – China does not try to surpass US hegemony.
- China replaces the United States as the center of world power, but everything remains more or

less the same. The Chinese political and economic model converges towards Western patterns – but less drastically than in the first scenario – and more importantly, the liberal world order survives unscathed: multilateral institutions, open trade, international cooperation and common challenges, and even some form of individual or community rights.

- China takes the place of the United States as the center of world power and this results in a restructuring of the architecture and values of the world system. The liberal world order is replaced by a Chinese order, Western values give way to Chinese values, and the pace of historical development is increasingly dictated by Beijing.
- Two world views are forced to coexist: China and the United States need to achieve some kind of balance, either through dividing the world into two spheres of influence or through some combination of integration on a par with competition and rivalry.

In turn, Henry Kissinger²⁰ suggests that the best case scenario will be a "coevolution", where both countries will pursue their internal imperatives, collaborate as much as possible and adapt their relations to minimise the possibility of conflict, which in practice is an acceptance that the total confluence of interests is impossible.

The Chinese state, of course, also has its own vision of what the international system should be, given its new status as a power with a global vocation. Under the concept of "peaceful development", China is conceived as a prosperous country, which has developed a new military defence capacity according to its new interests, meanwhile preserving its distinctive values as a society, but from a renewed position of strength. Its foreign policy prioritises the gradual approach, commitment to the harmonisation of positions, and avoidance of open conflict.

18 Allison, G. (2017). "Destined for war". Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston-New York, p. 244.

19 Maçães, B. (2018). "Belt and Road". Hurst, London, pp.185-186.

20 Kissinger, H.(2012). "China". Debate, Barcelona, chapter 12.

President Xi Jinping has made it clear in various official speeches that the present scenario is defined by “world multi-polarisation and economic globalisation”²¹, where mutual benefit must override traditional hegemonies. That means addressing global issues collectively, but respecting the principle of non-intervention.

The United States, in its latest National Security Strategy, made it clear that it views China through the prism of “competition between powers,” where Beijing seeks to challenge Washington’s interests and influence, in an attempt to erode its “security and prosperity.”²²

Whatever scenario plays out, it is pertinent to take them into account. Because designing a response of our own to navigate these troubled waters between the United States and China is one of the great challenges of Chile’s foreign policy, since they are our main partners and are perceived as such, according to the Ipsos survey.

It is a fact that we will never be the largest economy or the most populous country in the region, but this model that combines free trade with poverty reduction and an institution-based democracy has a significant foreign potential. One of the mistakes small countries can make is precisely underestimating how much large countries need them, especially in an era of increasing rivalry between the United States and China, where every support counts. Therefore, we must have the sufficient ability to do things on our terms. Defining, for example, that the “future is Asian”, as a strategic approach to reduce dependence on China in absolute terms by including a greater number of relevant actors, especially when its economy is slowing down and a third of Chilean exports have that destination. Also, another alternative is to look for alliances beyond the United States to ensure the security of the South Pacific, with countries like Australia and New Zealand.



21 Jinping, Xi. (2014). “La gobernación y administración de China”. Ediciones Lenguas Extranjeras, Beijing, p. 338.

22 United States of America (2017): “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, p.2, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

3. AN IDENTITY AROUND THE PACIFIC²³

If we ran a quick geography test, and asked people to identify Chile as either a continental or an insular country, most people would probably choose the former, since today we all more or less have a world map in mind. And if we still have doubts, we can check apps such as Google Earth for more details.

However, the map is not the territory, let alone its consequences. In this sense, Chile is probably an island, if we consider that it is surrounded by desert in the north, ice in the south, a massive mountain range to the east and the ocean on the west. To break this isolation, we have chosen to use the Pacific, which explains why today 95% of our trade with the world is maritime (including fuels), an economic structure similar to that of countries such as Australia, Japan or the United Kingdom (our partners); in other words, islands whose economic prosperity and food supply depend on their ability to project themselves toward the sea.

In this sense, the document “Seas of Chile, Vision 2040”²⁴, released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late January 2020, highlights the “political value of the sea” as a cornerstone of foreign policy, something that had been emphasized in documents of previous administrations²⁵, thus configuring an incipient State policy in this regard. The text takes a forward-looking perspective and invites us “to make the most of the set of comparative advantages offered by Chile’s maritime quality”, so that it serves to “foster an innovative international agenda, with realistic objectives and intelligent design.” One of its most concrete proposals is the creation of a Council of the Seas to crystallise the State’s vision on the matter.

When reviewing the foreign policy of island countries, such as those mentioned above, the sea plays a central role, in terms of both the abstract aspects (as part of its idiosyncrasy) and the more concrete aspects (the importance of freedom of navigation and protection of fishing resources). In this sense, the survey suggests that it is possible for Chile to project itself as a Pacific country, that assigns an important place to the defence of its maritime interests and the control of its adjacent seas.

In “Seapower States”, British historian Andrew Lambert explains that a maritime nation is not born out of its geographical location alone; if this were the case, Chile would undoubtedly be one, due to its “insular” condition, its thousands of kilometers of coastline and its tri-continental presence. Lambert maintains that it is instead the product of a “deliberate” – not spontaneous – construction²⁶ in the minds of citizens and society, which emerges to compensate for a perceived weakness vis-à-vis countries with a larger territory or population. It is true that the existence of an ocean fleet is necessary as a power factor when one depends on the control of the sea to survive, but the national maritime power is, in the end, the result of a different way of seeing the world, society and liberties. It is the result of an “oceanic vision”²⁷, which has already been conceptualised by the Chilean Navy.

Incorporating the sea as a cornerstone of Chile’s foreign policy and its identity as a nation follows this line of thought. Some of the most important issues today, from the fate of globalisation (commercial and digital) to climate change, are played out in the oceans today. But before moving forward, we must ponder what version of the Pacific Ocean Chile can point to in these times.

23 Adaptation of the column “Foreign policy, a sea of possibilities”, by Juan Pablo Toro, published in *El Mercurio*, January 26, 2020, p. A4.

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. “Seas of Chile, Vision 2040”, January 2020, p.6, available at http://files.imo-chile.cl/documents/mares_de_chile_vision_2040.pdf

25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). “Foreign Policy of Chile 2030”, p. 74.

26 Lambert, A. (2018). “Seapower States”. Yale University Press, p. 8.

27 Chilean Navy (2019). “Horizon in the Pacific”.

In its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, for example, as a reference model for Chile, Australia points to the “Indo-Pacific” to define its priority region and where it will seek to meet its strategic objectives. As stated in a footnote: “We define the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as the region ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by South-east Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States.”²⁸

It should be clarified that the concept of “Indo-Pacific” is a Japanese construction that was officially adopted by the United States, to equalize Chinese influence in the area. On June 1, 2019, the U.S. Department of Defence launched its “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to explain its position against what it calls its “priority theater” of action. The defined principles are:²⁹

1. Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations;
2. Peaceful resolution of disputes;
3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, and connectivity; and,
4. Adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight.

However, New Zealand – the model chosen by the experts – continues to use the Asia-Pacific concept in its document “Strategic Intentions”, where it outlines its goals and purposes for the 2019-2023 period. For example: “For national prosperity and security, New Zealand needs peace and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region of which we are a part. We can have positive impacts in shaping New Zealand’s environment through actions in regional organisations and bilaterally by working with a broad network of partners on our shared regional interests. We need to maintain a trajectory towards the free flow of goods, services, people and capital within a rules-based trading and economic system. We need a system in the region in which conflicts and disputes are managed.”³⁰

Even with the complexity that may be involved, a projection of Chile around the Pacific is still interesting, and as an idea, it is an open invitation to be developed. Also, it allows Chile to capitalise its maritime features as constituents of its identity, from the Strait of Magellan to Rapa Nui, including the exploits of national heroes from Captain Arturo Prat to pilot Luis Pardo, following the thesis widely developed by Lambert.



28 Australian Government. (2017). “Foreign Policy White Paper”, p.12. At: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf>

29 Indo-Pacific Strategy at <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>

30 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand, “Strategic Intentions 2019–2023” at: <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/About-us/MFAT-Strategic-Intentions-2019-2023.pdf>

4. TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Regarding Chile's national security and defence, the survey generally shows a high coincidence in how it is perceived by both experts and the general population, with only minor differences. Regarding threats and the military's main and complementary tasks, there is an apparent leeway arising from the characteristics of the current international system, in which the spectrum of the use of force has expanded.

Therefore, this suggests the need to achieve greater interstate coordination to neutralize the new threats, which requires an effective interagency coordination process, or what current literature refers to as "A Whole-of-Government approach". The current crises the country is facing, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have highlighted the need for permanent organisations and mechanisms to plan and analyse scenarios that are both robust in terms of authority and resources, and flexible and

timely in responsiveness, in order to face current challenges.

It is noted, however, that there is a need to more clearly communicate concepts of strategic security and defence to citizens for a better understanding of these issues. This is aggravated by the absence of formal programs at Chilean universities, where these issues do not receive the attention they deserve. In other words, we must create an academic culture of international security and national defence studies.

Finally, it is perceived that the main function of the Defence sector is preparation for war. We believe that this perception, while not incorrect, renders invisible the permanent contribution of the Defence sector to national peace and stability that the Armed Forces materialise on a permanent basis to allow national development and well-being. This represents a pending task for the Defence sector, and is reflected in the perception of both experts and the general public.

5. MORE AND BETTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Considering the intersection made evident in the survey between the priority objectives of foreign policy and perceived threats to the country's interests, the majority of which are transnational, it would be very appropriate to start looking at the approaches of countries such as Canada, which have been able to correlate their internal and external security. Incidentally, that would be a very good boost to improve the aforementioned inter-agency process, which is considered a priority. The value of defence and diplomacy lies in the ability to coordinate both instruments of power through a strategy that is logical and coherent with the national interest.

For example, decision makers in Canada consider maintaining the stability of the international system necessary in order for its economy to be able to trade with the rest of the world, and therefore, it is necessary to make a permanent contribution in the military field, since a nation with a level of

development like Canada simply cannot be a "free rider". "What makes foreign policy innovative in this regard is the belief that the security of the country depends on the security of others."³¹ Since Canada's national interests intersect with those of other nations, they work together in pursuit of neutralising threats to global security.

The tasks of "international cooperation" carried out by the Chilean Armed Forces, in compliance with the Defence's mission areas, can undoubtedly be made much more visible than at present, thus helping to understand the contribution that is made to maintain the stability of the international system. With more than 130 years of peace, Chile is and will be a net exporter of security.

Given all of the above, it is estimated that the fluid interaction of diplomacy and defence must be an objective to develop and strengthen in the short term. Based on this relationship, an effective inter-agency process can be built in the future, which allows us to face risks, challenges, threats and opportunities in a more efficient and timely manner.

31 Hristoulas, A., Denis, C. and Wood D. (2005). "Canadá: política y gobierno en el siglo XXI". Miguel Angel Porrúa, Mexico, p.255.

Methodological Annex

METHODOLOGICAL CHART



METHODOLOGY

- * Quantitative methods.
- * Non-probabilistic design of a quota sampling.



TECHNIQUE

- * Online poll applied on the national Ipsos cyber panel.
- * Start date: general population from the 10th to the 17th of March 2020. Experts, from the 9th to the 31st of March.



UNIVERSE

- * General population: male and females from ages 18 and above, from all of the regions.
- * Experts or opinion leaders: list of experts or opinion leaders involved with the studied topic.



SAMPLE

- * Sample of 1.360 cases at a national level in the general population.
- * 400 cases from the Metropolitan Region and 960 from the rest of the country.
- * 64 experts answered.

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
* For a study with probabilistic simulation, its reference error would be +/- 2.66% (For total results with maximum variance and 95% confidence).

** When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.

SAMPLES PROFILE

NONE PONDERING GENERAL POPULATION

—DISTRIBUTION—



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0.6

Special Thanks

At AthenaLab we want to thank, first of all, all those who answered the survey and Ipsos Chile for conducting it. But also to all the people who have shared their advice, experience and ideas in the first steps of this think tank, encouraging us to advance in this initiative dedicated to achieving a better understanding of international relations, security and defence.

Firstly, to our authorities in the field of International Relations such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodoro Ribera, Ambassador Roberto Ampuero, Ambassador Alfonso Silva, Ambassador Luis Schmidt, Ambassador James Sinclair, Ambassador Roberto Ruiz, as well as authorities from the Defence Ministry, headed by the Minister of National Defence Alberto Espina, Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Ricardo Martínez, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Julio Leiva, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force General Arturo Merino and Head of State Major Joint Admiral Rodrigo Álvarez, Undersecretary of Defence Cristián de la Maza, Undersecretary of the Armed Forces Alfonso Vargas, General Jorge Robles, Admiral Pablo Niemman, and Ministerial Legal Advisor Pablo Urquizar. Within the scope of the Ministry of the Interior, Undersecretary of the Interior Juan Francisco Galli.

We could not fail to mention foreign academics and authorities, who encouraged this type of study such as Ambassador Robert Fergusson, Ambassador Jamie Bowden, Ambassador Joseph Westphal, Ambassador Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere Sergio de la Peña. Academic authorities of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), headed by its director Karin von Hippel, Jonathan Eyal and Peter Roberts, from the London Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and its director John Chipman, from the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) James Rogers, and additionally Professor at the Institute for International Security Affairs Craig Deare. And of course, Parag Khanna, founder and director of FutureMap, Admiral (r) James Stavridis and Chris Fussell, President of McChrystal Group.

To conclude, a very especially thank to Senator Kenneth Pugh, Hernán Felipe Errázuriz, Heraldo Muñoz, Gabriel Gaspar, Beatriz Corbo, Lucía Dammert, Alfredo Labbe, Eduardo Rodriguez, general (r) Oscar Izurieta, general (r) Max Larraechea, Arturo Alessandri, Claudio García, Dorotea López, Carolina Sancho, Carlos Schaerer, Álvaro Fernández, Ricardo Neeb, Karen Poniachik, Jaime Baeza, Marco Oswald, Rafael Rincón, Jorge Sahd, Mario Correa, David Yang, CF Agustín Pájaro, CF Christopher Green, CN RN Chris Saunders, all of whom have additionally collaborated with Athenalab and this particular effort.

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